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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the winter of 1936–37, Flint, Michigan, played host to perhaps 
the most significant event in the history of American labor.  Hun-
dreds of striking automobile workers seized several factories in a 
General Motors (GM) production complex and held them for six 
weeks despite attempts by local authorities and GM agents to oust 
them.  In taking control of the factories, the strikers aimed to force 
the company to accept their right to form a union of their choice and 
to compel GM to recognize and bargain with it, as required by the 
newly enacted Wagner Act.  GM’s inability to reclaim its factories led 
to a near-complete shutdown of its operations nationwide and even-
tually caused the company to surrender to the strikers’ main de-
mands.  The boldness and tenacity of these “sit-down” strikers and 
their unexpected victory over this immensely powerful and stridently 
anti-union corporation catalyzed a nationwide wave of hundreds of 
sit-down strikes over the next several months.  The strikes would 
eventually prove critical to overcoming entrenched employer resis-
tance to basic labor rights and bringing about, for the first time in 
American history, extensive unionization of the industrial workforce. 
The sit-down strikes represent a tremendously important chapter 
in American history.  Although the historical literature on the strikes 
remains surprisingly thin, historians have stressed the strikes’ integral 
function in enabling the organization of industrial labor, thereby de-
termining the subsequent course of the labor movement and the po-
litical economy of twentieth century America.
1
  Legal scholars have 
also confronted the legacy of the sit-down strikes.  Karl Klare and 
James Pope, among others, have demonstrated the strikes’ essential 
role in overcoming judicial and political opposition to the Wagner 
Act and making way for a viable system of labor law.
2
  Scholars like 
Klare and Pope have also called attention to ways that the lawful pro-
hibition of these strikes, which took shape following the GM strike, 
altered the character of the labor movement.  These measures helped 
suppress more radical and progressive tendencies, laying the 
groundwork for the stagnation and morbidity that characterized the 
 
 1 See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–1937 
(1969); ROBERT H. ZIEGER, THE CIO: 1935–1955, at 46–61 (1995); Michael Torigan, 
The Occupation of the Factories: Paris 1936, Flint 1937, 41 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 324 
(1999). 
 2 Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern 
Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth 
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional 
Law, 1921–1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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course of the labor movement over the latter half of the twentieth 
century.
3
 
This scholarship is valuable for exposing the social and political 
consequences of the sit-down strikes and countering a tendency 
among many students and scholars of labor to either ignore the sit-
down strikes completely or dismiss them as aberrant and episodic 
phenomena with few lasting consequences.
4
  In fact, the sit-down 
strikes influenced the evolution of modern labor law in ways that le-
gal scholars and labor historians have yet to explore fully.  To be sure, 
scholars such as Klare and Pope have examined this issue in the con-
text of how the legal campaign against the sit-down strikes shaped the 
immediate course of labor law as well as the overall jurisprudential 
landscape of labor relations.
5
  Despite these efforts, there remains an 
absence of a thorough accounting of the strikes’ lasting impact on 
the practical content of labor law itself and, most especially, how the 
strikes transformed the contours of the right to strike. 
Tracing the legacy of the sit-down strikes is important for two 
major reasons.  The first reason is practical.  As this Article demon-
strates, legal and political attacks on labor rights that were originally 
aimed at the sit-down strikes have metastasized into a more general 
campaign to prohibit a broad range of militant strike practices, even 
those bearing little outward resemblance to the original sit-down 
strikes.  The consequences for organized labor have been quite grave, 
as this dynamic helped eviscerate the right to strike and, in effect, 
deprived labor of weapons it desperately needs to mount any mea-
ningful challenge to the entrenched power of employers in the 
workplace.  In this way, the reaction to the strikes helps to account 
for the dire state in which organized labor finds itself today.  Bringing 
this out is important not so much because it reveals some simple legal 
formula for rebuilding labor rights; to the contrary, it is important 
because it speaks to the tremendous difficulties that await any such 
effort.  Indeed, this Article argues that the reactionary legacy of the 
sit-down strikes suggests inherent, perhaps insuperable limits that 
may appertain to the right to strike in liberal society. 
 
 3 See generally Pope, supra note 2; Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, 
and the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935–1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45 
(2006); Ahmed A. White, Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of 
New Deal Labor Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 275, 335–50 (2004). 
 4 Leading labor law textbooks, for example, typically mention the strikes and the 
legal decisions they generated only in passing.  See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR 
LAW 76–80, 573 (14th ed. 2006); MICHAEL HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW 212 (6th ed. 
2003). 
 5 See sources cited supra note 3. 
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The second reason is more academic, as it concerns the state of 
literature on this subject and the contribution that a thorough ac-
counting of the consequences of the sit-down strikes can make to our 
understanding of the phenomenon.  As this Article stresses, the his-
torical meaning of the strikes is necessarily intertwined with the polit-
ical and legal results that flowed from them.  To the extent that these 
consequences have not been fully revealed, the historical understand-
ing of the strikes remains fundamentally incomplete. 
The legal legacy of the sit-down strikes is anchored by two deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States that addressed the 
strikes’ legality under labor law.  Decided within a few years of the 
Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, 
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.
6
 and Southern Steamship Co. v. 
NLRB
7
 held that sit-down strikes are illegal and that sit-down strikers 
may not benefit from the authority of the National Labor Relations 
Board (the NLRB or Board) to protect workers from employers’ as-
saults on labor rights with the usual remedies of reinstatement and 
back pay.
8
  More subtly, the Court in Fansteel and Southern Steamship 
also acceded to the criminal prosecution of sit-down strikers by state 
and federal officials, as did the Board in its litigation of these cases.  
These initial responses to the sit-down strikes would outline a much 
broader program of limiting the right to strike, involving the federal 
courts, Congress, the Board, and state and local police and judges.  In 
each of these institutional contexts, the Fansteel and Southern Steamship 
cases not only provided a legal foundation on which expanded at-
tacks on the right to strike could be based, but also tethered to their 
analysis the specter of ungoverned labor militancy and the fiction of a 
Board and system of labor rights that was (at least until the 1947 
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act) too tolerant of labor’s excesses.  It 
is by these means that the sit-down strikes have served to limit the 
Board’s authority under the labor law to protect strikers from em-
ployer reprisals, particularly where strikers engage in excessively con-
frontational or militant tactics; provided a jurisprudential rationale 
for courts to aggressively police the Board’s adherence to this pro-
gram; and justified a weak view of the preemptive effect of federal la-
bor law, thereby paving the way for states and local governments to 
use their criminal laws to impose their own limits on the right to 
strike. 
 
 6 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
 7 316 U.S. 31 (1941). 
 8 Id. at 38, 40–41, 48; Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 253, 255–56, 258, 261. 
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Although they have featured other aims, the immediate goal of 
most sit-down strikes was to prevent employers from resuming pro-
duction with replacement workers and crossovers, a goal that, if ex-
ecuted successfully, all but negates the value of a traditional strike.  
For this reason, sit-down strikes actually continued to occur well after 
Fansteel and Southern Steamship.  But with these cases so unequivocally 
prohibiting the tactic, strikers seeking to keep their employers’ oper-
ations closed have had to turn to other methods, from mass picket-
ing, to blocking streets and plant entrances, to verbal harassment and 
physical attacks on strikebreakers.  Significantly, the concepts origi-
nally developed to penalize sit-down strikes have evolved to prohibit 
these alternative tactics as well.  This fact reveals the central logic of 
this legacy that elevated traditional concepts of private property, au-
thority, and social order above the rights of labor: to enhance the 
ability of employers to defeat strikes and related modes of labor pro-
test. 
It is through this ideological and practical orientation that the 
sit-down strikes speak to the inherent limits of liberal labor law.  From 
its inception, American labor law has allocated labor rights in a tho-
roughly liberal fashion that eschews an interventionist, corporatist 
model of addressing conflicts between labor and employers.  Rather, 
American labor law relies on a relatively laissez-faire approach by 
which a union’s power ultimately derives from whatever force it can 
bring to bear through the strike.  Likewise, as reflected in the right it 
gives employers to replace strikers and resume business operations, 
American labor law abstains from more interventionist or corporatist 
approaches to the conduct of strikes themselves.
9
  For a strike to work 
in such a context, the union must of its own accord stop the employer 
from carrying on business.  And yet, what the sit-down strikes 
showed—and have continued to confirm through their legacy—is 
that American labor law doggedly embraces liberal concepts of pri-
vate property, authority, and order in a fashion that effectively denies 
workers the only tactics by which they might consistently accomplish 
a stoppage of their employer’s business.  The result of this fealty to 
liberal principles is a system in which the right to strike is prominent 
in a formal sense, but available in a meaningful way only for the rare 
workers who are economically irreplaceable, politically entrenched, 
or otherwise very lucky.  Because a meaningful right to strike is so 
central to a liberal system of labor rights, the larger consequence of 
 
 9 See SYLVESTER PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY (1957) (summariz-
ing this conception of labor law). 
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its devaluation is the inevitable bankruptcy of the entire system of la-
bor rights. 
In this legacy, this Article argues, can be found not only the full 
significance of the sit-down strikes but, indeed, the foundation of a 
great and tragic contradiction: militant unionists brought life to con-
cepts of labor rights through the use of sit-down strikes, and yet those 
strikes have since, in the determined hands of labor’s enemies, been 
useful for destroying a robust system of labor rights.  The strikes are 
both the embodiment and symbol of organized labor’s torturous en-
counter with modern capitalism.  For this reason, above all, no one 
who hopes to understand the history of labor relations and labor law 
in modern America can ignore them. 
This Article proceeds in several parts.  Part II briefly reviews the 
history of sit-down strikes.  It emphasizes their origins in early twen-
tieth-century America and their remarkable proliferation in the 
1930s.  This Part stresses the sit-down strikes’ role in the successful 
organization of basic industries, in the Court’s validation of the 
Wagner Act, and in employers’ eventual (and contingent) acquies-
cence to a more or less functional system of labor rights.  Part III 
then traces the sit-down strikes’ reactionary legacy as it emerged in 
the period from 1937 to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 
1947.  It begins by reviewing the history of Fansteel and Southern Steam-
ship, and then shows the role that these decisions, the Board’s appar-
ent reaction to them, and the strikes themselves played in Congress’s 
and the courts’ roles in opening the door to increasingly pointed at-
tacks on all forms of worker militancy.  This Part shows how the 
strikes both influenced the enactment of Taft-Hartley and framed key 
provisions of that notoriously anti-labor legislation.  Part IV continues 
this critique by demonstrating how the reactionary framework that 
emerged in response to the strikes has continued to influence the 
state of labor rights in the decades since Taft-Hartley by limiting the 
reinstatement of strikers, facilitating the intervention of state and lo-
cal officials in labor disputes, and subordinating labor law to other 
regimes of federal policy.  Part V concludes by elaborating on how 
the sit-down strikes’ reactionary legacy brings to light the inherent 
limitations of liberal labor law. 
II. A LEGACY OF REFORM: SIT-DOWN STRIKES AND THE RISE OF 
MODERN LABOR RELATIONS 
The influence of the sit-down strikes on the course of labor rela-
tions and labor law in the New Deal era has been well chronicled by 
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labor historians and legal scholars.
10
  Although it is not the primary 
focus of this Article to critique this literature, a review of its main 
themes frames the discussion of the eventual effect of sit-down strikes 
on the development of American labor law.  To this end, this Part re-
counts the history of sit-down strikes, from their origins to the GM 
strike at Flint, to their role in shaping labor relations in the critical 
period of the late 1930s, and finally to their immediate impact on the 
course of modern labor relations. 
A. The Early History of Sit-Down Strikes 
The Flint strike embodied the sit-down strike in its most classic 
form: a work stoppage in which the strikers occupied the workplace 
to prevent the employer from using it for a considerable period of 
time.  The concept is, however, quite spectral, contemplating not on-
ly the classic “stay-in” strike, but a range of less dramatic tactics, in-
cluding short, “quickie” strikes, characterized by brief, on-the-job 
work stoppages, and “skippy” strikes, characterized by intentionally 
sloppy performance on the production line.
11
  The initial focus of this 
Article is the classic stay-in strike.  But as will become evident as the 
discussion unfolds, the sit-down strike’s different manifestations all 
center on a core mode of protest, built around a challenge to the 
employer’s traditional prerogatives of property and authority. 
Sit-down strikes came into their own during the dramatic clash 
of labor and capital in Flint, Michigan, in the winter of 1936–37 and 
are forever associated with that moment in history; however, the tac-
tic emerged long before the Flint strike, even though it is impossible 
to know with complete certainty when the first sit-down strike oc-
curred.
12
  Michigan Governor (and future Supreme Court Justice
13
) 
Frank Murphy, who performed a delicate balancing act in trying to 
mediate the affair in Flint, quite understandably linked the strikes to 
the most ancient of origins: the protests of masons building the py-
ramids of Egypt.
14
  The particular claim may be debatable, but Mur-
phy’s general point―that protests resembling the modern sit-down 
strike surely have occurred since the dawn of civilization―is well tak-
en.  Murphy was also able to point to more recent and better-
 
 10 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 11 IRVING BERNSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1933–1941: THE 
TURBULENT YEARS 499 (1969); FINE, supra note 1, at 121. 
 12 See FINE, supra note 1, at 141. 
 13 J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, at vii (1968). 
 14 FINE, supra note 1, at 122. 
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documented examples of sit-down strikes, such as those by builders in 
fifteenth-century France and those by textile workers in eighteenth-
century France and nineteenth-century England.
15
  Other examples 
exist beyond those that Murphy identified.  Merchant ships were the 
scene of considerable labor protest in the eighteenth century, and 
strikes aboard ship were (and remain) like sit-down strikes by their 
very nature.
16
  The sit-down strike was a common—albeit usually brief 
and small-scale—feature of maritime labor relations at least through 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
17
 
The first documented sit-down strike in modern America involv-
ing factory workers occurred in 1884 in Cincinnati at the Jackson 
Brewery Company, when striking brewers barricaded themselves in 
the establishment and beat back attempts by police to oust them.
18
  
An episode resembling things to come unfolded in 1906 at a General 
Electric factory in Schenectady, New York, where some 3000 workers 
under the leadership of the Industrial Workers of the World occu-
pied the factory to protest the company’s refusal to reinstate three 
fired union members.
19
  The so-called “folded arms” strikers stayed 
inside for as long as three days.
20
 
These examples notwithstanding, the sit-down strike remained 
relatively uncommon in American labor relations until the 1930s.
21
  
The impetus for its increasing popularity in that decade, which fore-
shadows a major theme in the latter sections of this Article, was the 
increasingly aggressive attempt by workers to realize basic labor rights 
in the workplace, including the right to organize and compel collec-
tive bargaining.  Although credit for this upsurge in worker militancy 
ultimately belongs to the workers themselves, another factor was a 
change in the legal status of labor rights.  Until the New Deal, basic 
labor rights were all but completely denied to workers by an array of 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 MARCUS REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT 
SEAMEN, PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700–1750, at 96–100 
(1989). 
 17  Briton C. Busch, “Brace and Be Dam’d”: Work Stoppages on American Whaleships, 
1820–1920, 3 INT’L J. MAR. HIST. 95, 98–99 tbl.1 (1991); White, supra note 3, at 296–
300. 
 18 FINE, supra note 1, at 122. 
 19 MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF 
THE WORLD 71 (Joseph A. McCartin ed., abr. ed. 2000). 
 20 BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 499; PHILIP S. FONER, THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF 
THE  WORLD, 1905–1917, at 88 (1965). 
 21 See generally FINE, supra note 1, at 121–77 (discussing the emergence and proli-
feration of the sit-down strike in the early twentieth century). 
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legal doctrines that served the needs of anti-union employers, includ-
ing the widespread use of injunctions, the enforcement of anti-radical 
statutes, the discriminatory enforcement of everyday criminal laws, 
and of course the absence of any laws of consequence affirmatively 
protecting labor rights.
22
  In part because of increasingly strident or-
ganizing and effective political activism by labor—and in part because 
such changes accommodated a broader shift in political economy 
wrought by the Great Depression and the consolidation of monopoly 
capital—this condition was dramatically transformed in the early 
1930s.
23
  Of particular importance is Congress passing the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in 1932, which significantly limited the ability of em-
ployers to use federal court injunctions to undermine labor rights.
24
  
Also important was the 1933 enactment of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA).
25
  Although the Supreme Court found the 
NIRA unconstitutional soon after its enactment
26—thus setting the 
stage for a dramatic reversal in Jones & Laughlin Steel v. NLRB
27
 a few 
years later—the statute was very much the legislative cornerstone of 
the so-called “First New Deal.”28  Section 7(a) of the NIRA 
represented the first attempt by Congress to codify basic labor 
rights.
29
  Although the NIRA offered no real means of enforcing this 
provision (and desultory attempts to remedy this by executive order 
failed),
30
 it and the Norris-LaGuardia Act created a sense of overall 
change in labor’s legal condition and helped trigger an upsurge in 
labor-organizing efforts.
31
 
From the outset, this wave of union organization drew on mili-
tant tactics, including, for the first time in sustained fashion, sit-down 
strikes.
32
  The first modern sit-down strike is generally considered to 
have occurred in Austin, Minnesota, in November 1933, when ap-
 
 22 CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, 
AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 33–49 (1985). 
 23 See RAYMOND HOLGER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE 12–14 (2004). 
 24 Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §101 (2006)). 
 25 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, invalidated by Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935). 
 26 Schecter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 542. 
 27 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 28 See HOLGER, supra note 23, at 109. 
 29 Id. at 108. 
 30 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 172–85. 
 31 See id. at 35–125. 
 32 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2010  12:28 PM 
10 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
proximately 600 meatpackers seized a Hormel plant in a dispute over 
wages, working conditions, and the processing of struck livestock.
33
  
The strikers “released” the plant two days later after the Minnesota 
governor not only mobilized the National Guard but also helped 
convince Hormel to agree to arbitration and to abstain from punish-
ing the strikers.
34
  The Hormel sit-down strike actually occurred sev-
eral months after rubber workers in Akron, Ohio, began using the 
quickie sit-down strike to counter their employers’ elaborate and ag-
gressive anti-union tactics.
35
  But the Hormel strike was a more crucial 
manifestation of the tactic.  The years 1933 through 1935 saw numer-
ous sit-downs of both kinds, particularly in automobile and rubber 
factories.
36
  Within a very short time there would be many, many 
more. 
B. Sit-Down Strikes in the Second New Deal 
In 1936, there were forty-eight sit-down strikes (not counting 
shipboard strikes) that lasted at least one day; twenty-two of these, in-
volving almost 35,000 total workers, lasted even longer.
37
  There were 
many more sit-down strikes of the short, quickie type as well.
38
  Most 
of these strikes, regardless of their duration, involved unions affi-
liated with the CIO (then, the Committee for Industrial Organizing, 
and later, the Congress of Industrial Organizations), which had re-
cently been formed by American Federation of Labor (AFL) dissi-
dents intent on organizing the industrial workforce.
39
  Between 1936 
and 1939, there would be almost 600 major sit-down strikes, most of 
which were, again, mounted by industrial workers affiliated with the 
CIO.
40
 
Unlike the 1933 strike at Hormel, the dominant cause of sit-
down strikes in the period of the “Second New Deal” was the attempt 
by workers to organize unions in the face of vigorous—and often vio-
 
 33 Strikers Seize Huge Plant; Oust Packing House Owner in Pay Dispute, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Nov. 12, 1933, at 1. 
 34 Walter Fitzmaurice, Packing Plant Is Surrendered by Strike Army, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Nov. 14, 1933, at 5. 
 35 Louis Adamic, Sitdown: II, THE NATION, Dec. 12, 1936, at 702. 
 36 FINE, supra note 1, at 123; Daniel Nelson, Origins of the Sit-Down Era: Worker Mili-
tancy and Innovation in the Rubber Industry, 1934–38, 23 LAB. HIST. 198, 205–06 (1982). 
 37 FINE, supra note 1, at 123. 
 38 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 3, at 53–54 (describing dozens of sit-down strikes in 
Goodyear’s Akron, Ohio plant in 1936 alone). 
 39 FINE, supra note 1, at 123.  On the emergence of the CIO, see ZIEGER, supra 
note 1, at 22–24. 
 40 Pope, supra note 3, at 46. 
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lent and criminal—repression at the hands of their employers.41  This 
pattern became particularly pronounced in late 1936, just before the 
Flint strike erupted.
42
  That year, sit-down strikes emerged as a power-
ful and frequent tactic in the CIO’s struggle to overcome employer 
resistance in the rubber industry.
43
 
The Flint strike is a good example of how the strikes during the 
Second New Deal typically played out.  In 1936, GM was stridently 
committed to what industrial employers had long called the “open-
shop” concept.44  The term was meant to suggest these employers’ 
supposed indifference to whether the people who worked for them 
belonged to unions, but what it actually meant was that they aggres-
sively opposed attempts by its employees to organize functional, in-
dependent unions.
45
  In the mid-1930s, GM enforced its commitment 
to the open shop by the liberal use of threats and assaults, espionage, 
discriminatory discharges, and company unions.
46
  A Senate investiga-
tion at the time revealed that GM maintained at its plants a full-time 
staff of more than 1400 well-armed and well-trained company police, 
backed by an indeterminate number of part-time police.
47
  Moreover, 
GM fielded what the committee called an “amazing and terrifying” 
cadre of labor spies and provocateurs at its more than 100 plants.
48
  
The company itself employed about 200 spies.
49
  Some of these spies 
were provided by the more than dozen firms with which GM had con-
tracted to provide espionage services.
50
  Along with Chrysler, GM was 
the largest client of two of the most prominent labor “detective” 
agencies, Pinkerton and Corporations Auxiliary.
51
  Whether in-house 
or contracted, these professional spies coerced and cultivated net-
works of informants—”hooked men’’—who in turn spied as well.52  
Given these layers, it really cannot be said how many spies GM and its 
 
 41 See FINE, supra note 1, at 332 (describing the popularity of sit-down strikes in 
areas where unions are weak). 
 42 Pope, supra note 3, at 55–56. 
 43 See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, at 592–600. 
 44 FINE, supra note 1, at 29. 
 45 See id. at 22–23. 
 46 See id. at 29–48; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 47–49; see also BERNSTEIN, supra note 11, 
at 516–19. 
 47 Hearings Before the Comm. on Education and Labor, 75th Cong. 1998–2001 (1937) 
[hereinafter LaFollette Committee Hearings]. 
 48 S. REP. NO. 75-46, pt. 3, at 46, 56 (1938) 
 49 Id. at 23. 
 50 Id. at 92–93. 
 51 Id. at 8, 14, 18. 
 52 Id. at 50. 
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sister companies actually used, but the numbers were clearly enorm-
ous.  So extensive and convoluted was espionage at GM, that the 
company found itself in the ridiculous position of spying on its own 
spies.
53
 
This was all done in defiance of the company’s statutory obliga-
tions under NIRA and the Wagner Act, and with equal contempt for 
rulings by the labor boards created under these statutes.
54
  By 1936, 
the primary target of GM’s anti-unionism was the United Automobile 
Workers (UAW), which was rapidly emerging as the main agent of 
industrial unionism in the automobile industry.
55
  In the face of GM’s 
resistance, it was impossible for UAW to gain—let alone prove—
majority support in the plants.
56
  In such a context, strike success 
emerged as a prerequisite for organizing success, as rank-and-file 
workers, fearing for their jobs and safety, waited for a successful strike 
to prove that the union—or the law—could actually protect them.57 
The sit-down strike offered an effective response to this dilem-
ma.  Most notably, a successful sit-down strike would check the em-
ployer’s ability to continue production with replacement workers and 
crossovers.
58
  A sit-down strike could also be executed with the active 
support of only a minority of workers; a few workers at a critical point 
could shut down an entire factory.
59
  The ability to succeed with small 
numbers was an important advantage in the face of employer repris-
als.
60
  The tactic also allowed strikers to avoid the risks of arrest and 
assault by police or company guards, which was often their fate on 
outdoor picket lines.
61
  Furthermore, a sit-down essentially held the 
safety of the plant hostage, because it forced the employer to play the 
role of aggressor if it wanted to end the strike by force.
62
  Finally, the 
sit-down tactic provided the union an extraordinary forum for culti-
vating loyalty and solidarity among workers, offering rank-and-file 
workers a salient symbol of the union’s ability to confront the em-
 
 53 Id. at 22–23, 46–61. 
 54 FINE, supra note 1, at 29–48; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 47–49. 
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AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935–1941, at 132–34 (1960). 
 56 See FINE, supra note 1, at 75 (discussing organizational difficulties at the plant). 
 57 Id. at 98–99; ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 43–45. 
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ployer, as well as numerous occasions for the actual practice of mu-
tual support.
63
 
Even before the First New Deal, automobile workers began to 
challenge the open shop aggressively.
64
  In the summer of 1930, a 
Communist union with a titular presence in many of the plants led a 
strike at Fisher Body, a GM subsidiary in Flint, Michigan—one of the 
plants that would host the great sit-down strike a few years later.
65
  Af-
ter a few days, the strike was smashed by police who broke up pickets 
and arrested dozens of strikers.
66
  The company and its allies followed 
this up with a torrent of anti-radical propaganda.
67
  In March 1932, 
twenty-three workers and their supporters were shot, with as many as 
four killed, by police and company guards at a protest against hunger 
and unemployment at the main gate of Ford’s River Rouge megap-
lant in Dearborn, Michigan.
68
 
Although battles such as these failed to end the open shop, they 
were witness to a powerful undercurrent of conflict and anger among 
the industry’s workers, as well as organizers and activists determined 
to force the issue.  The enactment of section 7(a) of the NIRA ampli-
fied this current.  A major strike erupted in 1933 at Ford suppliers 
Briggs Manufacturing and Murray.
69
  In 1934, a strike that began at 
Fisher Body in Cleveland spread to several other GM plants; however, 
little came of it.
70
  Later that same year, a strike at Electric Auto-Lite, a 
parts producer in Toledo, ended in a sustained battle between work-
ers and 1350 National Guardsmen that left two protesters shot dead 
and a score on both sides injured.
71
 
The Flint sit-down strike arose amidst increasing use of the tactic 
in nearby areas, including Detroit, and at other GM facilities nation-
wide.
72
  In the lead-up to the strike, emboldened UAW organizers 
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“harass[ed] supervisors,” orchestrated numerous quickie strikes, and 
increased membership “tenfold,” signing up some 3000 members in 
December 1936 alone.
73
  The immediate triggers of the Flint strike 
were the company’s discriminatory discipline and discharge of a 
number of workers, its continuing refusal to engage the UAW in 
meaningful collective bargaining, and a rumor that the company was 
about to preempt the strike by removing critical machinery to anoth-
er facility.
74
 
On the surface, the union’s focus on Flint might have seemed 
foolish because the city’s economy was largely dominated by GM.  On 
the other hand, the union had great success organizing workers in 
Flint, and not by accident: workers in Flint endured a particularly 
grim tradition of arbitrary disciplinary tactics and repression of basic 
labor rights.
75
  Moreover, Flint was the closest thing to a central hub 
in GM’s far-flung production network and a successful strike there 
could be especially advantageous.
76
  All of these factors prompted the 
events in the early winter of 1936.  On December 30, 1936, in a move 
that was outlined by the union’s leaders but executed spontaneously, 
UAW workers seized Fisher Body Plants Nos. 1 and 2.
77
 
The takeover was dramatic, but it unfolded smoothly and quick-
ly.  The strikers quickly ejected foremen and managers, secured the 
sprawling facilities against outside invasion, and set about devising 
accommodations.
78
  The strikers would hold the factories until Febru-
ary 11, 1936―an extraordinary forty-four days.79  During this time 
they repelled a major assault by the police—an affray known as the 
“Battle of the Running Bulls”—and defied two court injunctions or-
dering them to leave.
80
  Weeks into the stand-off, the strikers also im-
proved their position by seizing another plant in GM’s Flint complex, 
which produced vital engine assemblies.
81
  From the outset, the strik-
ers managed to establish in their ranks a degree of order and discip-
line that impressed even their adversaries.
82
  The logistics involved in 
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keeping the plants continuously manned and defended by hundreds 
of workers were impressive enough.  As the union had hoped, the 
shortages created by the strike bottle-necked production and crip-
pled GM; the strike spread to fifteen GM facilities in other parts of 
the country, eventually idling 136,000 production workers.
83
 
As the strike wore on, GM found itself boxed in by its inability to 
act and could not convince Michigan Governor Frank Murphy to 
storm the Flint factories with the National Guard, President Roosevelt 
to intervene with the CIO leadership, or the strikers to emerge with-
out a settlement in place.
84
  Just as critically, the strike accomplished 
its goal by totally neutralizing GM’s impressive means of labor repres-
sion.
85
  Indeed, the strikers’ ability to flout those means tended to fur-
ther enhance their reputation.
86
  Moreover, by succeeding with such 
an audacious strategy, the strikers were not only able to influence GM 
directly, but as the strike’s rapid spread to other plants revealed, they 
also communicated to other GM workers the possibility of overcom-
ing the company’s strident, seemingly inviolable opposition to labor 
rights.  Under mounting political and economic pressure, GM was 
forced to yield to a preliminary agreement that provided for the 
company’s eventual recognition of the union as the exclusive agent 
of the company’s industrial workforce.87 
C. Sit-Down Strikes and the Construction of Modern Labor Relations 
Perhaps the most important effect of the Flint strike was what it 
communicated to industrial workers across the country.  The strike 
was front-page news nationwide.
88
  Workers who followed the strike’s 
course could not fail to draw from it the remarkable conclusion that, 
if properly led and supported, a union could wrest recognition and 
bargaining concessions from even the most powerful anti-union em-
ployers.
89
  Autoworkers in particular responded with a new confi-
dence in industrial unions and in the sit-down tactic.  In the weeks 
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immediately following the end of the Flint strike, the UAW con-
ducted at least eighteen sit-down strikes at other GM facilities before 
the company and the union finally agreed to a company-wide con-
tract in mid-March 1937.
90
  In March, about 6000 UAW members oc-
cupied Chrysler’s Detroit plants.  Following a tense standoff that 
lasted into April, the company settled with the union, agreeing to the 
union’s partial (“members only”) representation of the company’s 
100,000 employees.
91
  During the same period, the UAW successfully 
organized a number of smaller automakers, some by sit-down strikes.  
As a result, overall dues-paying membership in the UAW increased 
from 88,000 in February 1937 to 400,000 in October of that year.
92
  By 
that time, of the major automobile manufacturers, only Ford re-
mained unorganized.
93
  Against the backdrop of years of bitter failure 
in the face of vicious opposition, the union’s success in these few 
months was nothing short of phenomenal. 
The impact of the strikes extended well beyond the automobile 
industry.  “Within days of the settlement of the General Motors 
strike . . . the sit down technique literally spread from coast to 
coast.”94  While 1936 saw only a couple of dozen sit-down strikes, 
there were 477 that lasted at least one day in 1937, a figure that 
represented one in ten major strikes that year.
95
  In March 1937, 
“[t]he sit-down movement reached its all-time high . . . when 170 
such strikes involved 167,210 workers.”96  Just as remarkably, sit-down 
strikes that year involved more than 100,000 active participants and 
idled 400,000.
97
  And they were not confined to any particular indus-
try.  As labor historian Sidney Fine notes, “The sit-downs involved 
every conceivable type of worker—kitchen and laundry workers in the 
Israel-Zion Hospital in Brooklyn, pencil makers, janitors, dog catch-
ers, newspaper pressmen, sailors, tobacco workers, Woolworth girls, 
rug weavers, hotel and restaurant employees, pie bakers, watchmak-
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ers, garbage collectors, Western Union messengers, opticians, and 
lumbermen.”98 As Fine also points out, the large majority of sit-down 
strikes in this period continued to be CIO-led and were aimed at 
overcoming industrial employers’ entrenched resistance to union or-
ganizing.  Over 80 percent were successful or partly successful despite 
the fact that they tended to occur in industries with strong histories 
of employer anti-unionism and correspondingly weak unions.
99
 
One industry where the sit-down strike proved especially signifi-
cant was maritime shipping.  Seamen were no strangers to sit-down 
strikes, arguably having originated the tactic.
100
  But in 1936 and 1937, 
they resorted to the strikes as never before, undertaking probably 
hundreds of individual shipboard strikes against shipping companies 
staunchly opposed to independent union representation.
101
  By the 
middle of 1936—well before the UAW occupied GM’s factories—the 
situation had reached, in the words of one media account, a “guerilla 
war at sea.”102  In March 1936, almost 400 members of the crew of the 
passenger steamer California struck that vessel as it approached San 
Francisco to protest the company’s wage policies, persecution of un-
ion supporters, and foot-dragging in the negotiation of a new con-
tract.
103
  The strikers remained aboard, preventing the vessel from 
completing its voyage and preventing its owner, Panama Pacific 
Lines, from simply dumping them in that distant port and hiring a 
scab crew. 
Within days, the affair had become a major crisis, with the strik-
ers’ impromptu leader, a crewman named Joe Curran (who would 
later become a national labor leader), negotiating with Secretary of 
Labor Frances Perkins, who in turn negotiated with the company and 
with Roosevelt and other members of his cabinet.
104
  Perkins brokered 
a settlement that ended the strike, but the settlement proved mea-
ningless after Curran and the other strikers were fired and blacklisted 
when the ship returned to its home port of New York.
105
  But in the 
long run, the California strike inspired a veritable onslaught of ship-
board sit-down strikes, led by Curran and other dissidents over the 
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objections of the moribund and company-dominated union that no-
minally represented them.
106
  By late 1936, their efforts had led to the 
formation of an independent CIO union, the National Maritime Un-
ion (NMU).  On the strength of its militant tactics, by the late spring 
of 1937, the NMU had become the dominant sailor’s union on the 
East Coast and Great Lakes.
107
 
Sit-down strikes tipped the balance in other industries as well, as 
they inspired workers to take bold action and employers to fear the 
ultimate consequences of continuing to so vigorously oppose organiz-
ing efforts.
108
  A revealing example of this is the influence of sit-down 
strikes in the steel industry.  In March 1937, the CIO’s success against 
GM helped its Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) win 
recognition from another industrial colossus, U.S. Steel; although 
won without direct resort to the sit-down strike, the agreement drew 
substantial benefit from the tactic, as the union’s victory over GM im-
pressed U.S. Steel’s leadership considerably with the risks of contin-
ued resistance.
109
  U.S. Steel’s decision is especially notable consider-
ing “Big Steel’s” opposition to union representation had been no less 
complete than GM’s. 
SWOC followed this victory over Big Steel with one over another 
large steel producer: Jones & Laughlin.  Jones & Laughlin’s violent 
anti-unionism had lead to numerous unfair labor practices charges 
before the NLRB, making the company the lead party in the land-
mark Supreme Court case decided that spring.
110
  In May 1937, 
SWOC staged a massive and tumultuous strike at Jones & Laughlin’s 
mills in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa, Pennsylvania.
111
  The Aliquippa 
strike was particularly audacious because the town was largely owned 
and controlled by the company.
112
  For its record of labor repression, 
the town was dubbed “Little Siberia” in labor circles.113  Dramatically 
inverting the usual sit-down tactic, the strikers virtually encircled the 
Aliquippa mill in a massive cordon, sealed off its gates, attacked cros-
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sovers, fought police, and forced a costly two-day closure.
114
  During 
the strike, the company agreed to an election, which SWOC won.  
The company ultimately recognized the union and signed a contract 
that was even more favorable than the agreement SWOC entered into 
with U.S. Steel.
115
 
The sit-down strikes had a different impact on SWOC’s battle for 
recognition at other large independent steel producers, the so-called 
“Little Steel” companies, which had declined to follow U.S. Steel’s 
shift in labor policy.
116
  This group included Republic Steel, Bethle-
hem Steel, Youngstown Sheet & Tube, American Rolling Mills, Na-
tional Steel and Inland Steel.
117
  Under the leadership of Republic 
Steel, the companies savagely—and, for a time, successfully—resisted 
SWOC’s effort to organize their workers long after the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in Jones & 
Laughlin.
118
  In the summer of 1937, police, scabs, company guards 
and National Guardsmen killed at least sixteen (possibly eighteen) 
strikers and supporters in worker protests in the southern Great 
Lakes region.
119
  A measure of these employers’ hostility emerged 
when the Board attempted to enforce the law against Republic Steel.  
The Board’s prosecution of unfair labor practice charges brought to 
light an extraordinary array of outrageous anti-union practices, in-
cluding espionage, bribery and corruption of law enforcement, and 
having strikers beaten up and shot.
120
  Congressional investigations 
revealed quite a few more examples of such conduct.
121
 
Although these and other practices initially discouraged efforts 
to organize these companies’ workers by direct action, Republic Steel 
and other Little Steel companies eventually accepted the authority of 
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the Wagner Act.
122
  SWOC filed scores of unfair labor practice com-
plaints against the companies for discrimination, intimidation and 
coercion, unlawful discharges, espionage, and similar charges, which, 
in the wake of Jones & Laughlin, the Board was able to prosecute and 
enforce despite inevitable company appeals.
123
  The case against Re-
public Steel alone resulted in an order to reinstate some 7000 em-
ployees.
124
  At the same time, however, the Little Steel strike would, 
like the sit-down strikes, play an important role in framing the coun-
ter-attack on labor rights that would culminate in the Taft-Hartley 
Act. 
The Little Steel companies’ trajectory from initial contempt for 
labor rights to eventual acquiescence was actually quite typical among 
American businesses right up to and beyond the time of the sit-down 
strikes.
125
  As Karl Klare notes, employer hostility to the Wagner Act in 
the 1930s was characterized by the expenditure of “vast resources in 
systematic and typically unlawful antiunion campaigns involving such 
tactics as company unionism, propaganda, espionage, surveillance, 
weapons stockpiling, lockouts, pooling agreements for the supply of 
strikebreakers, and terrorism.”126  In the first few years after the sta-
tute was passed even Board personnel struggling to enforce the law 
against these firms labored under threats of physical assault and legal 
persecution at the hands of hostile local officials and company 
guards.
127
 
As has been shown, some employers’ hostility was overcome by 
the sit-down strikes themselves.  But even among those employers 
that were not brought around by direct action, opposition to the 
Wagner Act ultimately rested on the assumption that the law was—
and would soon be found by the Supreme Court to be—
unconstitutional.
128
  When the statute unexpectedly cleared this hur-
dle, these employers often yielded to the law’s mandates—at least 
once they were ordered to do so by the Board.
129
  And if they did not 
do so immediately, they did so eventually, like the Little Steel compa-
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nies, when their appeals were exhausted.
130
  This, along with the re-
quirement that such companies recognize labor rights as a condition 
of participating in an expanding war economy, allowed labor to rely 
on the NLRB’s unfair labor practice prosecutions and Board-
sponsored elections to achieve basic organizing and collective bar-
gaining goals that only a few years earlier seemed utterly out of reach.  
And the agency’s handling of both types of cases rose dramatically.131 
The initial result from this process of forging labor rights in ba-
sic industries was a huge increase in the CIO’s membership rolls as 
well as its political and economic clout.
132
  It quickly emerged as a po-
werful rival to the more conservative, craft-oriented, and less militant 
AFL.
133
  Continued aggressive organizing under an increasingly effec-
tive regime of labor rights would eventually combine with the re-
sounding economic recovery brought about by the Second World 
War to yield truly spectacular advances in both membership and the 
prevalence of collective bargaining.
134
  These developments would in 
turn help drive unprecedented increases in wages and economic se-
curity for the industrial working class, laying the foundation of an 
unparalleled period of post-War middle-class prosperity.
135
  To be 
sure, prosperity and security would come with a price—reflected in 
increasing disenchantment and de-politicization of the working 
class.
136
  Moreover, the process by which these changes came about 
was a gradual one that had to overcome continuing hostility to the 
law and the NLRB’s authority among employers.137  Eventually, the 
AFL would recapture the initiative from the CIO and, as will be 
shown, the law would become an important obstacle for militant un-
ionism.
138
  But in the meantime, the gains won during this period 
would provide the demographic and institutional foundation of a 
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kind of golden age of industrial unionism that would define the polit-
ical economy of twentieth-century America. 
It is important not to attribute such gains simply to the valida-
tion of the Act and the emergence of the NLRB out of the shadow of 
unconstitutionality, for the Wagner Act and the NLRB did not merely 
replace sit-down strikes and other forms of direct action as the pre-
ferred mode of effective labor activism.  Rather, these institutions in-
herited and transformed the rights that workers had earned for 
themselves through direct action.  As the forgoing review of the 
strikes makes abundantly clear, a number of powerful, industry-
leading manufacturing companies like GM and U.S. Steel abandoned 
their virulently anti-union programs and yielded to the mandates of 
the Act because of the sit-down strikes.
139
  It does not suffice to suggest 
that these or any other anti-union employers would simply have 
changed their position once the Supreme Court upheld the Act; were 
it not for the sit-down strikes, it is doubtful that the Act would have 
been upheld as constitutional. 
As James Pope demonstrates, labor regarded the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Schechter Poultry to invalidate the NIRA (including 
section 7(a)) as a challenge to the very concept of progressive eco-
nomic reform that left the constitutionality of its successor, the 
Wagner Act, very much in doubt.
140
  In this light, as Pope puts it, the 
sit-down strike “became a form of constitutional politics,” a means by 
which workers sought to realize the rights that employers—as well as 
the Supreme Court—denied them.141  Remarkably, those who led and 
participated in the strikes understood them as such.
142
  After the 
Court upheld the Wagner Act in Jones & Laughlin Steel
143
 (and its sev-
eral companion cases
144
), workers reacted in the same fashion: con-
struing the judicial victory as legal validation of a victory already won 
in factories and mills across the land.
145
 
By this account, the sit-down strikes forced the Court’s hand.  If 
the Court had invalidated the Wagner Act amidst all these militant 
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Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 
103, 133 (1937); Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 147 (1937). 
 145 Pope, supra note 2, at 89–90. 
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assertions of basic labor rights against defiant employers, CIO union-
ists and other labor militants would likely have responded by sustain-
ing—perhaps even amplifying—their campaign of sit-downs.  Such a 
scenario would not only have exposed the Court’s impotence but 
would have also implicated the Court in causing the rising tide of so-
cial unrest, especially when two additional factors are considered.
146
  
First, President Roosevelt, who was then threatening to “pack” the 
Court with New Deal supporters, had shown little inclination to end 
the strikes by force.
147
  Second, local and state officials had also prov-
en, by and large, either equally disinclined to intervene or simply un-
able to do so successfully.
148
  In this context, upholding the Act 
emerged as a decidedly more attractive option.
149
 
For Klare, the very meaning of the Wagner Act remained in 
doubt for months after its passage.  The business community not only 
attempted to defeat the Act, but there were competing visions among 
those who supported it regarding how exactly the Act would govern 
labor relations.
150
  Many of the Wagner Act’s New Deal supporters 
were deeply ambivalent about its overall program and may have sacri-
ficed some or all of its legal protections of labor rights to some other 
interests.
151
  Until this contest was settled there was, as the history of 
the strikes shows, no real labor law.  Klare also stresses that the 
process of forging the Act’s meaning was accomplished not only by 
the courts, the Board, and other elite institutions, but by labor it-
 
 146 Id. at 90–91; Pope, supra note 3, at 95–97. 
 147 Pope, supra note 3, at 91–93. 
 148 Id. at 87–91. 
 149 Part of Pope’s argument is, of course, dedicated to refuting competing ac-
counts of the Court’s “switch in time.”  To the claim that this change in constitution-
al law resulted from “incremental” advances in jurisprudence, Pope responds by ex-
posing the contradictions that remained in the Court’s reasoning, particularly as 
between the Court’s apparently earnest emphasis on Congress’s authority under the 
Commerce Clause in Jones & Laughlin and its apparent indifference to this issue in 
several other Wagner Act cases decided at the same time.  Pope, supra note 2, at 93–
96.  Similarly, he stresses that, if the impetus for the change in law was primarily to 
avoid Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme, this could have been accomplished, with 
more apparent consistency than the court actually displayed, by upholding the Act in 
the Jones & Laughlin case (or, better yet, two other Wagner Act cases presenting even 
clearer issues of interstate commerce), but overturning its application in the other 
cases, which involved smaller employers with far fewer apparent effects in interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 95; see also JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD 225–30 (1974) (discussing theories to explain the Supreme Court’s 
new outlook on labor legislation). 
 150 See GROSS, supra note 110, at 22–23 (discussing the process of establishing the 
meaning of the Act). 
 151 See, e.g., FINE, supra note 1, at 29–31, 50; GROSS, supra note 149, at 141–47. 
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self—and, in this respect, not only by the movement’s top leaders, 
but by rank-and-file workers and shop-floor activists.
152
  The central 
means by which labor managed to participate in this process was the 
sit-down strike, which presented the prospect of disorder and embo-
died an alternative vision of labor rights, thereby influencing the 
Court’s ultimate decision to uphold the Wagner Act.153  Pope explores 
this last theme at great length in an article that confronts the claim 
earnestly advanced by many sit-down strikers that, as workers, they en-
joyed a limited property right in a workplace that embraced their 
right to strike there.
154
 
For both Klare and Pope, a great deal was lost in the Court’s 
translation of labor rights won on picket lines and shop floors into 
formal, legal rights.
155
  Pope is particularly keen to emphasize the 
consequences of the Court’s (and Congress’s) reliance on the Com-
merce Clause to ground the constitutionality of the Wagner Act.
156
  
For this orientation, he presents an alternative justification that was 
advanced by organized labor based on the Thirteenth Amendment,
157
 
which would have incorporated the labor law into a vibrant culture of 
industrial democracy and freedom far better than the Court’s ap-
proach did.  The Commerce Clause approach anticipated a bureau-
cratized program of industrial relations oriented to labor peace, but 
was conspicuously antithetical to these very things.  It may therefore 
be seen as a betrayal of the very tradition of solidarity, activism, and 
struggle that brought about a system of meaningful labor rights in the 
first place.
158
  Klare likewise emphasizes that the Court’s approach in 
Jones & Laughlin and its companion cases was not anti-labor in its 
conception so much as it was in its failure to conceptualize the Act as 
a decisive departure from conventional liberal jurisprudence.
159
  For 
Klare, this paved the way for the development of a regime of labor 
rights that was fatally rooted in reactionary notions of contract, pri-
vate property, and authority.
160
 
 
 152 See Klare, supra note 2, at 266. 
 153 Pope, supra note 3, at 83–84. 
 154 Id. at 47–48. 
 155 See Klare, supra note 2, at 268–70; Pope, supra note 3, at 107–11. 
 156 Pope, supra note 2, at 6–8. 
 157 Id. at 4–5. 
 158 Id. passim. 
 159 Klare, supra note 2, at 298–300, 311–12. 
 160 Id. at 311–12. 
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III. AND A FOUNDATION OF REACTION: THE SIT-DOWN STRIKES AND 
THE ASSAULT ON THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, 1937–47 
While the sit-down strikes proved to be essential to the develop-
ment of a functional system of labor rights, they also inspired reac-
tionary responses from courts and politicians.  These responses would 
eventually coalesce in an equally dramatic counterattack against the 
sit-down strikes, which would lay the foundation for an ever broader 
challenge to labor rights and the right to strike in particular.  This 
Part traces the first part of this development as it played out from 
1937 through 1947—from the Supreme Court’s decisive rulings 
against sit-down strikes in Fansteel and Southern Steamship, to the initial 
impact of these cases on the administration of the labor law, and fi-
nally to the important role the strikes played in framing the radically 
anti-labor agenda of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
A. The Supreme Court and the Sit-Down Strikes 
Until 1939, most sit-down strikes were resolved between workers 
and employers at the point of action.  Many of the strikes ended in 
victory for the strikers, some were abandoned, and a few ended with 
the forcible eviction of the strikers by local police and company 
forces.
161
  Seldom were the courts or the Board much involved.  On 
quite a few occasions, courts issued injunctions against sit-down strik-
ers, but these were rarely effective.
162
  Similarly, although a number of 
strikers, including leaders at Flint, were charged with crimes, the au-
thorities usually dropped the charges sometime after the strikes 
ended.
163
  As Pope makes clear, all of this left the legal status of the 
strikes unclear for a time.
164
 
The Court’s decision in Jones & Laughlin presented an opportu-
nity to erase this ambiguity.  If the statute was constitutional and the 
Board’s authority legitimate, then workers could no longer justify the 
sit-downs as extreme responses to extreme circumstances.  Perhaps 
more importantly, after Jones & Laughlin, the courts could act against 
the sit-down strikers without it appearing as a one-sided attack on la-
bor.  In fact, the sit-down strikes by their very nature posed a funda-
 
 161 See Pope, supra note 3, at 84–91. 
 162 For example, the Chrysler sit-down strikers were ordered to evacuate by a cir-
cuit court judge, but the injunction could not possibly be enforced by the sheriff.  
CHARLES K. HYDE, RIDING THE ROLLER COASTER: A HISTORY OF THE CHRYSLER 
CORPORATION 116 (2003). 
 163 FINE, supra note 1, at 318. 
 164 See Pope, supra note 3, at 62. 
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mental question: how far did the Wagner Act impinge employers’ 
traditional property rights and workplace prerogatives?  Ironically, 
because Jones & Laughlin upheld the Act, it left the courts free to de-
cide this question. 
Notwithstanding Jones & Laughlin’s overall effect in increasing 
compliance with the Wagner Act, quite a few employers continued to 
flout the Act and the Board.
165
  This intransigence inspired workers to 
continue to resort to sit-down strikes to force employers to comply 
with the law; such were the circumstances of both Fansteel and South-
ern Steamship, with the notable difference that the Fansteel strike 
(though not the litigation) occurred before Jones & Laughlin and the 
Southern Steamship strike occurred afterwards.
166
  In both cases it was 
Jones & Laughlin’s validation of the Act that cleared the way for the 
Supreme Court to rule on the legality of the strikes.  And in both cas-
es, the Court declared the sit-down strikes fundamentally unlawful.
167
  
In so doing, the Court subordinated the Wagner Act to a degree of 
conservative ideology of property and authority that negated the pro-
gressive potential of both the Wagner Act and the New Deal.  This is a 
critique that Klare and others have levied effectively against the sit-
down strike cases.
168
  Not so well established, however, is how the 
Court’s decisions in Fansteel and Southern Steamship facilitated attacks 
on the right to strike that would extend to tactics that bore little re-
semblance to the original sit-down strikes. 
1. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. and Its Aftermath 
The dispute that led to Fansteel began in the summer of 1936, 
when SWOC undertook to organize Fansteel Metallurgical Corpora-
tion, a relatively small manufacturer and distributor of rare metals 
and alloys located in North Chicago, Illinois.
169
  In September of that 
year, Lodge 66 of the union that hosted SWOC’s organizing efforts, 
the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of 
 
 165 See GROSS, supra note 110, at 6–8 (discussing the employers’ persistent refusal 
to follow the law after Jones & Laughlin). 
 166 See S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 33 (1942) (noting that 
the strike occurred in July 1938); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 
247 (1939) (noting that the strike occurred in February 1937).  The Supreme Court 
decided NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin on April 12, 1937.  301 U.S. 1, 1. 
 167 Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 46; Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 256. 
 168 See, e.g., Klare, supra note 2, at 321, 324–25. 
 169 In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 932 (1938), enforcement de-
nied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as mod-
ified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner at 1863, 1867–
68, 1871, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436). 
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North America-CIO, approached Fansteel with a request for recogni-
tion and bargaining.
170
  Fansteel rejected the union’s request and 
over the next several months proceeded to violate the statute in a 
range of ways designed to destroy the union: Fansteel proposed and 
eventually formed a company union; it refused to bargain with any 
“outside” union representative; it reassigned Lodge 66’s president to 
isolate him from rank-and-file workers; it hired a labor spy to infil-
trate the union; and it repeatedly refused to recognize or bargain 
with the union.
171
  On February 17, 1937, the union, which by that 
time commanded a large majority of support, again requested that 
Fansteel submit to bargaining.
172
  Again, the company refused.
173
  The 
plant superintendent, A.J. Anselm, justified the company’s refusal by 
questioning the constitutionality of the Wagner Act and surmising 
that the Supreme Court would hold it unconstitutional.
174
  Shortly 
thereafter, the union “held a meeting and decided to hold the plant 
as a protest against [Fansteel’s] refusal to enter into collective bar-
gaining.”175  That afternoon, ninety-five or so members of the union 
then at work seized two buildings at the plant that housed critical 
production facilities.
176
 
The seizure, which immediately shut down Fansteel’s produc-
tion, was accomplished peacefully.
177
  All supervisors, female em-
ployees, and workers opposed to the strike were permitted to leave.
178
  
That evening, the plant superintendent, accompanied by two police 
officers and company counsel, approached the buildings and de-
manded that the strikers leave; when they refused, the lawyer in-
formed them that they were fired.
179
  The next day, Fansteel secured 
 
 170 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1868–69. 
 171 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 939–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, 
supra note 169, at 1870–80. 
 172 As the Board determined, while the union probably could not demonstrate 
majority support when it first demanded recognition in September 1936, it could 
demonstrate majority support by a wide margin by February 1937.  In re Fansteel, 5 
N.L.R.B. at 940; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1878. 
 173 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1878–79. 
 174 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as 
modified, 306 U.S. 240. 
 175 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880. 
 176 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942 (asserting that there were ninety-five strikers in 
the building); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1886 
(placing the number of strikers at ninety-four). 
 177 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880. 
 178 See id. 
 179 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, su-
pra note 169, at 1880. 
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an injunction from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, and a 
writ of attachment (for arrest of the strikers), which were read to the 
strikers that same day.
180
  The strikers still refused to evacuate the 
plant.
181
  The following morning, February 19, “a large force of depu-
ty sheriffs [about 100] attacked the building in an effort to dislodge 
the workers.  They used gas bombs, clubs and a battering ram but 
were repulsed by the employees,” who threw missiles and acid down 
at the police.
182
 
Receiving supplies from co-workers, the strikers continued to oc-
cupy the buildings for another week.
183
  In the meantime, Fansteel re-
jected efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Governor of 
Illinois to mediate the standoff.
184
  On February 26, the company in-
stigated an effort by a larger force of deputies to recapture the build-
ing.
185
  By attacking in the early hours with more powerful weapons, 
the deputies were eventually able to gain control of the buildings and 
arrest most of the strikers (a few apparently made off in the chaos), 
although only after a “pitched battle.”186 
As the Board confirmed, the strikers abstained from any mali-
cious destruction of Fansteel’s property during the strike; in fact, like 
other sit-down strikers, they even attempted to protect sensitive ma-
chinery while they held the buildings.
187
  Nevertheless, fighting during 
the two attempts by police to retake the buildings, as well as the fail-
ure of the heating systems (for which the company was likely respon-
sible), caused a fair amount of damage to the buildings and their 
contents.
188
  Some four months after the strike, thirty-seven of the 
men who had participated in the strike were tried and convicted of 
 
 180 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, su-
pra note 169, at 1880. 
 181 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880. 
 182 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as 
modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 
169, at 1880. 
 183 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, 
supra note 169, at 1880. 
 184 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943. 
 185 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1880. 
 186 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943; see also Launch Attack on Sitters: Gas Squadron Ra-
ids Plant at North Chicago, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 26, 1937, at 1. 
 187 See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 942 (stating that the strikers “kept the machines 
oiled as best they could”). 
 188 Id. at 942–43; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 
1880.  Fansteel later claimed that damages exceeded $60,000.  Fansteel Metallurgical 
Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1938), aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 
(1939). 
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criminal contempt before the Lake County Circuit Court that had en-
joined the strike; twenty-four strikers were fined $100 and sentenced 
to ten days in jail, eleven were fined $150 and sentenced to 120 days 
in jail, and two were fined $300 and sentenced to 180 days in jail.
189
  
The court reserved the most severe punishment for two union orga-
nizers who were not employees of the company: Oakley Mills was 
fined $500 and sentenced to 180 days in jail and Meyer Adelman, 
who had been organizing at Fansteel since the previous summer and 
coordinated the strike, was fined $1000 and sentenced to 240 days in 
jail.
190
  All of these men would serve out their sentences.
191
 
It was actually Adelman who, on behalf of Lodge 66, filed unfair 
labor practice charges against Fansteel.  The initial unfair labor prac-
tices charges against Fansteel, which related entirely to the company’s 
refusal to recognize and bargain with the union, were filed in Sep-
tember 1936.
192
  On May 21, 1937, Adelman filed amended charges, 
which pressed a number of other issues.
193
  Some of these issues con-
cerned Fansteel’s conduct before and during the sit-down strike, 
while others related to its post-strike treatment of the workers.
194
  In 
the meantime, the union continued a conventional strike against 
Fansteel, punctuated by several other unsuccessful attempts to get the 
company to recognize and bargain with the union.
195
  For its part, 
Fansteel resumed operations after the sit-down strike with crossovers 
and replacement workers.  Moreover, in April 1937, it finally consti-
tuted a full-fledged company union, the Rare Metal Workers of Amer-
ica, Local 1.
196
 
On May 26, 1937, the regional director of the NLRB issued a 
formal complaint charging Fansteel with numerous violations of the 
Act, including unlawfully refusing to recognize and bargain with 
 
 189 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Steel, 
Iron & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938). 
 190 Fansteel, 14 N.E.2d at 993.  The NLRB’s opinion in the case misstates the num-
ber of strikers jailed, describing “most” as being so punished.  In re Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 943 (1938), enforcement denied, Fansteel, 98 F.2d 375, 
aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
 191 3 in Fansteel Sitdown Strike End Jail Terms, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 5, 1939, at 13. 
 192 Charge Before the NLRB at 23, NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 
240 (1939) (No. 436). 
 193 Amended Charge Before the NLRB at 32, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436). 
 194 Id. at 32–33. 
 195 See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 943–44 (1938); Intermediate Report of the Trial 
Examiner, supra note 169, at 1882. 
 196 See In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 946–47; Intermediate Report of the Trial Ex-
aminer, supra note 169, at 1882, 1897–900. 
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Lodge 66, committing espionage against the union, sequestering the 
union president and forbidding him to speak to other workers, at-
tempting to dominate Lodge 66, forming a company union, discharg-
ing the sit-down strikers and several who aided them “for the reason 
of their membership in the union and that they engaged in con-
certed activity for the purpose of collective bargaining and for other 
mutual aid and protection,” and later rehiring some of the strikers 
and their supporters on a discriminatory basis premised on their wil-
lingness to renounce the union or their rights under the statute.
197
  
Fansteel denied all of these accusations, stressing that its discharges 
of the sit-down strikers were justified by the illegal and violent nature 
of the strike.
198
 
In September 1937, the trial examiner assigned to the case re-
leased his ruling in the form of an Intermediate Report.  Based on 
testimony from 116 witnesses and numerous documents, the report 
came only after the trial examiner overcame several dilatory tactics by 
Fansteel, including an attempt to enjoin the proceedings on the 
ground that the matter was then pending before the Illinois Circuit 
Court in the form of the criminal contempt proceedings.
199
  The re-
port methodically confirmed every unfair labor practice lodged 
against Fansteel by the regional director.
200
  The report directed that 
Fansteel recognize and bargain with Lodge 66, cease and desist from 
its efforts to form a company union, and offer reinstatement and 
back-pay to all but a handful of employees whose discharge the trial 
examiner considered justified by reasons not related to the strike.
201
  
On the key question of how to deal with the sit-down strikers, the trial 
examiner rejected Fansteel’s reference to the strike as justification for 
discharging the strikers, noting, first, that the strike had been pro-
voked by Fansteel and, second, that any claim that strike participation 
gave Fansteel cause to discharge the strikers was negated by the fact 
that the company either reinstated or offered reinstatement to scores 
of strike participants—in each case with the implicit condition that 
they abandon the strike and renounce the union.
202
 
Both Fansteel and the union appealed the trial examiner’s rul-
ing to the Board.  While the union’s exceptions were minor, Fans-
 
 197 Complaint at 31, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436). 
 198 Answer at 73, Fansteel, 306 U.S. 240 (No. 436). 
 199 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 169, at 1865–66. 
 200 See id. at 1900–02 (summarizing the trial examiner’s conclusions). 
 201 Id. at 1902–05. 
 202 Id. at 1882–96. 
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teel’s were “voluminous.”203  With one important exception, the 
Board upheld all of the trial examiner’s determinations.  The Board 
rejected the trial examiner’s conclusion that the discharges of the sit-
down strikers and the company’s refusal to offer them unconditional 
reinstatement were, in themselves, violations of the anti-
discrimination provision of the Wagner Act.
204
  In the Board’s view, 
the sit-down strikers were never actually discharged during or after 
the strike.
205
  Moreover, while most of the strikers remained off the 
job, this was not because they had been discharged or denied reins-
tatement; rather, it was because they were still out on strike.
206
  Al-
though the Board considered it likely that Fansteel would have de-
nied reinstatement to the strikers had they applied “in a body,” this 
had not yet occurred and therefore could not be the basis of a claim 
of unlawful discrimination.
207
 
The Board agreed with the trial examiner that the pattern of un-
fair labor practices warranted a remedy that would “restore as fully as 
possible the situation that existed prior to the respondent’s unlawful 
conduct.”208  This meant, among other things, the collective reins-
tatement of the strikers.  That they had engaged in the sit-down strike 
was no defense for Fansteel, the Board held, for two reasons.  First, 
the Board emphasized that Fansteel “does not come before the Board 
with clean hands” because its “gross violations of the law . . . were the 
moving cause” of the sit-down strike.209  Anticipating an argument it 
would make before the Supreme Court, the Board went even further, 
suggesting that the statutory duty imposed on employers to recognize 
and bargain with a union, which Fansteel systematically flouted, was 
conceived precisely to prevent the kind of intense labor conflict that 
came about in this case.
210
 
 
 203 In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 932 (1938), enforcement de-
nied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (1938), aff’d as modified, 306 
U.S. 240 (1939). 
 204 Id. at 944. 
 205 Id. at 945–46. 
 206 Id. at 944–45. 
 207 Id. at 945. 
 208 Id. at 949. 
 209 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 949. 
 210 See id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 42 (1937)).  
The other major point on which the Board disagreed with the trial examiner was 
whether Fansteel was obliged to recognize and bargain with the union in September 
1936; the Board found that the union did not present evidence of majority support 
at this juncture.  Id. at 940. 
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Second, the Board confronted the company’s claim that the 
criminal nature of the strike deprived it of the power to order the 
strikers’ reinstatement, regardless of whether they had been dis-
charged or not.
211
  On this point, the Board’s unwillingness to find 
that the strikers had been discharged reveals its significance.  If the 
strikers had never actually been discharged for their participation in 
the sit-down strike, they remained unequivocal employees under the 
Act and potential beneficiaries of the Board’s remedial authority—
without the Board having to show that the discharges themselves were 
unlawful or engage the unsettled issue of whether a discharge would 
terminate employee status under the Act.
212
  Moreover, this reading of 
events forced the company to argue that this strike barred reinstate-
ment as a remedy for other violations of the Act, not simply that it was 
adequate grounds to discharge.  The Board focused on the issue of 
Fansteel’s unclean hands, holding that the company should not es-
cape legal consequences when its own unlawful conduct was so egre-
gious that it provoked an illegal response from its employees.
213
  In 
such a circumstance, the Board reasoned, its prerogative to fashion 
remedies to advance the aims of the Act clearly trumped Fansteel’s 
post hoc rationalizations.
214
  The Board went a step further on this is-
sue, stressing that it did not automatically discount strikers’ criminal 
behavior in deciding whether to order their reinstatement and citing 
several cases involving serious felonies in which it had, in fact, re-
jected that remedy.
215
  The Board’s purpose in mentioning this con-
sideration was to show that it weighed all the equities and found 
reinstatement, among other, less controversial remedies, essential to 
effectuating the Act. 
Fansteel appealed the Board’s decision to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit.  Although the court deferred to the 
Board’s conclusion about Fansteel’s use of a labor spy and its support 
for a company union, it overturned the Board on every other issue.
216
  
At the center of the court’s reasoning was its unqualified view that sit-
down strikes were illegal, that Fansteel discharged the strikers and 
their supporters because of this, and that the discharges were there-
 
 211 See id. at 949–50. 
 212 See id. at 950. 
 213 Id. at 949. 
 214 See id. at 949–50. 
 215 In re Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 949–50. 
 216 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 380–81 (7th Cir. 1938), 
aff’d as modified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
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fore justified.
217
  Accordingly, Fansteel could have no duty to bargain 
with the strikers on that day or any subsequent day, as the discharges 
left the union without majority support in Fansteel’s workforce.218  
Moreover, the court held, the discharged workers thereby lost their 
status as employees under the Act and were no longer entitled to the 
rights it conveyed.
219
 
Though largely built around arguments for deference to the 
Board,
220
 the dissenting judge’s opinion effectively laid bare the real 
policy questions before the court.  First, referring to the majority’s 
claim that a decision to uphold the Board would constitute “an ap-
proval of the unlawful acts of the employees,”221 Judge Treanor re-
torted that “it is as meaningless as would be the contention that a re-
versal of the order of the Board constitutes an approval of the 
[employer’s] unlawful defiance of the National Labor Relations Act 
[NLRA].”222  Treanor also noted that while the sit-down strikers may 
have been in the wrong, “it is obvious that they did not make a great-
er mistake as to the law than did the petitioner and its advisors who 
believed that the petitioner could rightfully refuse to bargain collec-
tively with the agent of the employees on the ground that the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act was unconstitutional.”223 
The Supreme Court did not hear arguments in Fansteel until 
January 1939 and did not decide the case until February 27 of that 
year—two years and one day after the police recaptured the plant.224  
As is normal in the progression of a case from an administrative 
agency to the Supreme Court, the Court’s decision distilled both fac-
tual and legal questions to a minimal set of issues.  In this instance 
though, the process served to prejudge the dispute.  In the view of 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who wrote the majority opinion, 
the case presented only one important question: whether the Board 
 
 217 Id. at 380–82. 
 218 Id. at 382. 
 219 Id. 
 220 The dissenting judge contended simply that the Board’s conclusions regarding 
the employer’s violations of the Act were clearly supported by evidence and war-
ranted deference by the court; that the Board was right to consider the strikers to 
remain employees under the Act, and thus lawful beneficiaries of its remedial au-
thority; and, finally, that the remedies chosen by the Board were also appropriate 
means of effectuating the statute’s policy aims.  Id. at 383–89 (Treanor, J., dissent-
ing). 
 221 Id. at 388. 
 222 Fansteel, 98 F.2d at 389 (Treanor, J., dissenting). 
 223 Id. 
 224 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 240 (1939). 
WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2010  12:28 PM 
34 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
had the authority to order the reinstatement of the sit-down strik-
ers.
225
  For Chief Justice Hughes, the issue was simply a matter of 
whether the Board would be allowed to endorse employees’ criminal 
behavior at the expense of employers’ property rights and business 
prerogatives. 
Even more explicitly and tersely than the Court of Appeals, 
Chief Justice Hughes deferred to the Board’s findings regarding un-
fair labor practices that occurred prior to the commencement of the 
sit-down strike.
226
  Turning to the central issue, Chief Justice Hughes 
then quickly showed his hand.  Noting that the Board had changed 
its position on whether the employer’s statements to the strikers con-
stituted a genuine mass discharge, but without engaging the reasons 
for the shift, Chief Justice Hughes declared the “discharge was clearly 
proven.”227  Moreover, he deemed the discharges thoroughly justified 
by the sit-down strike: “[I]t was a high-handed proceeding without 
shadow of legal right” that gave “good cause” for the strikers’ dis-
charge unless this was otherwise prevented by the Wagner Act.
228
 
On this question, Chief Justice Hughes was equally strident.  
While he conceded that Fansteel had violated the labor law, he held 
“there is no ground for saying that it made respondent an outlaw or 
deprived it of its legal rights to the possession and protection of its 
property.”229  In Chief Justice Hughes’ view, this fact gave Fansteel “its 
normal rights of redress,” which includes “the right to discharge 
wrongdoers from its employ.”230  To the Board’s claim—supported by 
the broad wording of the relevant provisions—that the strikers none-
theless remained employees under the Wagner Act and were thereby 
entitled to benefit from the Board’s remedial powers, Chief Justice 
Hughes said simply that “[w]e are unable to conclude that Congress 
intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ re-
gardless of their unlawful conduct.”231  Chief Justice Hughes provided 
a similar response to the Board’s alternative claim that the provision 
 
 225 Id. at 247. 
 226 See id. at 251–52. 
 227 Id. at 252. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. at 253. 
 230 Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 254.  Hughes did not address directly Judge Treanor’s dis-
sent, which suggested that perhaps the strikers’ “outlaw” status should not automati-
cally disqualify them from the protections of the law.  Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. 
NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 384 (7th Cir. 1938) (Treanor, J., dissenting), aff’d as modified, 306 
U.S. 240 (1939). 
 231 Id. at 255. 
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of the statute granting its remedial authority—section 10(c), which 
broadly accorded the Board the power to adopt remedies that effec-
tuate the aims of the Act—allowed it to order the strikers’ reinstate-
ment even if they were no longer statutory employees.
232
  Purporting 
to affirm the Wagner Act’s fundamental purpose in advancing basic 
labor rights of self-organization and collective bargaining, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes resorted to formalism: “There is not a line in the statute 
to warrant the conclusion that it is in any part of the policies of the 
Act to encourage employees to resort to force and violence in de-
fiance of the law of the land.”233 
This brusque, even imperious, rejection of the Board’s case was 
reflected even more clearly in the way the Court assessed the employ-
er’s rehiring campaign after the sit-down strike.  As the Board saw it, 
Fansteel’s practice of conditionally rehiring some of the strikers not 
only demonstrated the falsity of the employer’s assertion that it dis-
charged the sit-down strikers (if this occurred at all) because of their 
misconduct during that episode, it also constituted another violation 
of the statute: an attempt by the employer to condition reemploy-
ment on renunciation of union support and the right to strike.
234
  
Chief Justice Hughes dismissed this argument by simply taking for 
granted Fansteel’s claim—which had been explicitly refuted by the 
regional director, the trial examiner, and the Board—that it only of-
fered reinstatement to employees whom the union had forced to par-
ticipate in the strike.
235
  Beyond this, Chief Justice Hughes merely ap-
pealed to an employer’s supposedly inherent right to decide whom it 
employs.
236
 
Chief Justice Hughes concluded his opinion by invoking similar 
reasoning to deny the Board the power to reinstate those employees 
who supported the sit-down strikers.
237
  The Court then rejected the 
Board’s attempt to order Fansteel to recognize and bargain with Lo-
cal 66, holding that the valid discharge of the sit-down strikers had 
sufficiently changed the union’s circumstances to absolve Fansteel of 
any such obligation,
238
 and noting that the Board could order an elec-
 
 232 See id. at 257. 
 233 Id. at 257–58. 
 234 See In re Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 944–46 (1938), enforce-
ment denied, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v NLRB, 98 F.2d 375 (1938), aff’d as mod-
ified, 306 U.S. 240 (1939). 
 235 Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 259. 
 236 See id. 
 237 Id. at 259–61. 
 238 Id. at 261–62. 
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tion instead.
239
  Finally, in a meaningless concession to the Board and 
the union, Chief Justice Hughes upheld the Board’s determination 
that the Rare Metal Workers Union was an unlawful company un-
ion.
240
 
Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion was not joined by all of his col-
leagues on the Court.
241
  Justice Reed, joined by Justice Black, dis-
sented on the question of reinstatement, taking the majority to task 
for inflexibly construing the “lawlessness” of the sit-down strikers as 
necessarily determinative of the limits of the Board’s authority.242  In 
Justice Reed’s view, the Wagner Act very clearly charged the Board 
with effectuating its goal of industrial peace obtained via a functional 
system of labor rights.
243
  In this respect, the Board acted reasonably 
and appropriately in dealing with a dispute in which both sides “had 
erred grievously in their respective conduct.”244  Under such circums-
tances, Justice Reed concluded, it was simply not appropriate for the 
Court to second-guess the Board’s solution.245 
Chief Justice Hughes’s opinion in Fansteel is a resounding reaf-
firmation of the Court’s adherence to traditional notions of private 
property, social order, and workplace authority after the tumult and 
uncertainty of the previous years.  In Fansteel, Chief Justice Hughes, 
who in the preceding years had authored the lead opinions in both 
Schechter Poultry and Jones & Laughlin, made clear that the New Deal 
did not fundamentally alter the relationship between labor rights and 
property rights.  Rather, as Pope describes it, Fansteel verified that 
“the employer could violate the workers’ statutory rights without sa-
crificing its property rights, while the workers could not violate the 
employer’s property rights without sacrificing their statutory rights—
a return to the hierarchy of values that predated the Wagner Act.”246  
To this it might be added that the decision also subordinated the Act 
(and the Board as well) to a comprehensive ideology of order and au-
thority that recognized the right of employers, but not workers, to 
 
 239 Id. at 262. 
 240 Id. at 262–63. 
 241 Justice Harlan Fiske Stone concurred with Hughes in all but the Chief Justice’s 
narrow reading of the term “employee” and his reliance on this reading to limit the 
Board’s remedial authority.  Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 263–65 (Stone, J., concurring in 
part). 
 242 Id. at 265–68 (Reed, J., dissenting in part). 
 243 Id. at 266–67. 
 244 Id. at 267. 
 245 See id. at 265–68. 
 246 Pope, supra note 3, at 106. 
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resort to illegal acts of self help.  Similarly, for Klare, Fansteel embo-
died the restoration of legal formalism in labor law jurisprudence, a 
perspective that would secure the elevation of often reactionary legal 
doctrines, such as Chief Justice Hughes’s appeal to property rights, 
over a view of labor rights focused on the textured realities of labor 
relations.
247
  By all of these means, Fansteel helped frame a jurispru-
dence that broadly repudiated the Wagner Act’s more reformist ten-
dencies and, still more broadly, made clear the limits of the New Deal 
as a whole.
248
 
In reaction to Fansteel, employers fired hundreds of workers.
249
  
They also began to defend themselves against Board reinstatement 
orders by arguing that the workers in question had engaged in sit-
down strikes.
250
  In more than a few cases, the Board found itself 
compelled by the black letter of Fansteel to deny reinstatement.
251
  
Nevertheless, under the leadership of Chairman J. Warren Madden, 
the Board continued to search for ways to reconcile Fansteel with the 
implementation of a meaningful system of labor rights in a climate of 
vigorous employer opposition.
252
  Accordingly, in quite a number of 
cases, the Board rejected the employer’s claim that a sit-down strike 
had occurred, finding the claim either pretextual or a circumstance 
 
 247 See Klare, supra note 2, at 323–34. 
 248 See id. at 325; Pope,  supra note 3, at 106. 
 249 Most notably, two New Jersey companies, Archer Daniels Midland and Mergott, 
retroactively fired several hundred employees for their participation in sit-downs.  50 
More Lose Jobs on Sit-Down Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1939, at 18. 
 250 See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 994, 999 (1941); In re United Dredg-
ing Co., 30 N.L.R.B. 739, 766–67, 787 (1941); In re Ford Motor Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 873, 
914 (1941); In re Cudahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 837, 867 (1941); In re Metal Hose 
& Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 1121, 1138 (1940); In re Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 
N.L.R.B. 347, 431 (1940). 
 251 See, e.g., In re Ore S.S. Corp., 29 N.L.R.B. 954, 978 (1941); In re Aladdin Indus., 
Inc., 22 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1220 (1940), enforced as modified, 125 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1942); 
In re Berkerman Shoe Corp. of Kutzman, 21 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1237 (1940); In re Read-
ing Batteries, Inc., 19 N.L.R.B. 249, 259 (1940). 
 252 Madden, a conscientious moderate committed to the vigorous and earnest en-
forcement of the statute, was apparently shocked by the outrageous conduct so fre-
quently brought to light by Board investigations.  GROSS, supra note 110, at 12.  The 
two other members of the post-Jones & Laughlin Board, Edwin Smith and Donald 
Wakefield Smith, both leaned to the left and favored the aggressive enforcement of 
the statute.  Id. passim.  Another important figure in shaping Board policy during this 
period was Nathan Witt, a leftist who served as the Board’s secretary from 1937 to 
1940.  Id. at 13, 110–13, 135–36.  The staff and membership of the Board in the late 
1930s and early 1940s comprised a politically diverse array of people (including, for 
the time, an inordinate number of women professionals); in general, though, even 
the relative conservatives were people who believed in the Wagner Act and were 
committed to enforcing it vigorously and fairly.  Id. passim. 
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outside the definition of Fansteel.
253
  In other cases, the Board contin-
ued to order reinstatement when the strikers left peacefully when in-
structed by the police or when the employer rehired some of the 
strikers in a discriminatory fashion.
254
  Nevertheless, this fundamental-
ly realistic approach to the issue did not always receive the approval 
of courts, which occasionally declined to enforce reinstatement or-
ders in such cases.
255
 
Militant unionists achieved an important victory before the 
courts that ran counter to the spirit of Fansteel in late 1939 when the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld a Board decision 
ordering Republic Steel to reinstate strikers implicated in serious vi-
olence.
256
  In Republic Steel, a case arising out of the 1937 Little Steel 
strike, the Board refused to account for allegations of criminality or 
violence not backed by guilty pleas or convictions.
257
  Stressing the 
company’s provocation of the strike and the fact that it was manifestly 
“guilty of brutal acts of violence” far more serious than those of the 
strikers, the Board ordered the reinstatement of strikers who had 
been convicted of crimes of violence, excepting only those convicted 
of serious felonies.
258
  Although it followed other courts and rejected 
the Board’s attempts to reinstate some strikers who were guilty of se-
rious misdemeanors, the Third Circuit’s decision upheld the Board’s 
reinstatement of the other strikers.
259
 
While Republic Steel did not involve a sit-down strike, the court’s 
decision to uphold the Board seemed to speak directly to the pro-
priety of the contextual approach to sit-down strikes and related 
forms of protest that the Board was then trying to articulate in the 
 
 253 See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 31 N.L.R.B. at 1026–27, 1086–87, 1107; In re United 
Dredging Co., 30 N.L.R.B. at 787–90; In re Ford Motor Co., 29 N.L.R.B. at 914; In re Cu-
dahy Packing Co., 29 N.L.R.B. at 868; In re Condenser Corp. of Am., 22 N.L.R.B. at 431; In 
re Metal Hose & Tubing Co., 23 N.L.R.B. at 1138.  On this critical tendency by the 
Board, see also NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U.S. 318, 340–42 (1940) 
(upholding Board order of reinstatement against attempt by employer and court of 
appeals to invoke Fansteel where this issue not raised before the Board itself). 
 254 See, e.g., In re Stewart Die Casting Corp., 14 N.L.R.B. 872, 879, 895–97 (1939), 
enforced as modified, 114 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1940); In re Universal Film Exch., Inc., 13 
N.L.R.B. 484, 489 (1939). 
 255 See, e.g., McNeely & Price Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 878, 881 (3d Cir. 1939), mod-
ifying In re McNeely & Price Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 800 (1938). 
 256 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 107 F.2d 472, 479–80 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 
311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
 257 In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 390–91 (1938), enforced as modified, 
107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). 
 258 Id. at 391. 
 259 Republic Steel, 107 F.2d at 477–78. 
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wake of Fansteel.  Ironically, the nature of this relationship between 
Republic Steel and the Board’s sit-down strike jurisprudence would be 
confirmed in due course, as a broader and more reactionary reading 
of Fansteel came to govern cases like Republic Steel.
260
  As will be seen, 
Fansteel’s restrictive reading of labor rights would eventually swallow 
Republic Steel. 
Although Fansteel contributed to a reduction in the frequency of 
sit-down strikes—which by 1939 was already down compared with the 
preceding two years—the decision did not stop such strikes entirely.261  
Quickie sit-downs, usually arising as unplanned, wildcat strikes, con-
tinued to occur for years after Fansteel.
262
  On quite a few occasions, 
such strikes resembled the signature sit-downs of a few years earlier in 
scale, if not duration.  In early 1941, for example, CIO members 
joined independent unionists and used a sit-down strike to briefly 
close an International Harvester plant in East Moline, Illinois.
263
  
Around the same time, SWOC unionists engaged in sit-downs at Beth-
lehem Steel in Lackawanna, New York,
264
 and U.S. Steel in Pitts-
burgh.
265
  In April of that year, a twelve hour sit-down strike at Ford’s 
enormous River Rouge complex featured in a lengthy and deter-
mined campaign by UAW activists to counter the veritable reign of 
terror that the company had continued to use to suppress organizing 
efforts.
266
 
These strikes inevitably reflected two often closely related dy-
namics: first, the conflicts that arose in newly (and often tenuously) 
recognized unions trying to establish their legitimacy and functionali-
ty; and second, the persistence of a more categorical opposition to 
labor rights across the economic landscape.  While Jones & Laughlin 
portended a significant change in industrial relations and invigorated 
the Board’s enforcement efforts, the decision did not convince all 
 
 260 Militant labor scored another victory when the Supreme Court, in Apex Hosiery 
Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512–13 (1940), ruled that a sit-down strike did not consti-
tute a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
 261 Pope, supra note 3, at 107–11. 
 262 Id.; James R. Zetka, Jr., Work Organization and Wildcat Strikes in the U.S. Automo-
bile Industry, 1946–1963, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 214, 215 (1992). 
 263 C.I.O. Union Joins Harvester Strike; Tie-Up May Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1941, at 
1; Plant Closed in Harvester Labor Dispute, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 17, 1941, at 29. 
 264 Bethlehem Union Stirs Plant Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1941, at 7; 300 on Sit Down 
Strike in C.I.O. Steel Dispute, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 25, 1941, at 7; 100 Working on Defense 
Job Call Sitdown Strike, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 8, 1941, at 3. 
 265 Workers Return after Sit-Down Strike at Carnegie-Illinois Plant, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 
1941, at 2. 
 266 Ford Defies CIO Strikers, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 2, 1941, at 1. 
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employers to drop their resistance to the legal protection of basic la-
bor rights.  Newly unionized firms continued to test the power of un-
ions to translate representation into meaningful gains in compensa-
tion and control over the workplace.
267
  Other companies, including 
many that had not yet accepted union representation at all, remained 
committed to testing the Board’s ability to enforce the law’s basic te-
nets, holding out hope that the statute would be amended or that the 
Board would, under the pressure of both employer intransigence and 
conservative political activism, retreat from the earnest view of labor 
rights that defined its first few years of existence.
268
 
Fansteel actually fueled both modes of employer resistance.  It 
undermined labor’s ability to resort to the kinds of weapons—the sit-
down strikes and related tactics—that had proved so integral to the 
realization of meaningful labor rights, and it signaled to the Board’s 
opponents the Board’s relatively tolerant approach to such tactics.269  
Ironically, though, employer intransigence inspired continued resort 
to the sit-down strike, albeit in a somewhat less frequent and less 
spectacular fashion than before.
270
 
2. Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB 
Southern Steamship emerged out of such continuing conflict.  As 
mentioned, the maritime transport industry was an important arena 
of militant labor activism in the late 1930s.
271
  As in automobiles, steel, 
and other basic industries, the targets of this militancy were employ-
ers intent on resisting workers’ claims for basic labor rights notwith-
standing the Wagner Act.
272
  Like Fansteel, the Southern Steamship 
Company occupied a small niche in an industry dominated by large 
concerns; in the last years of the 1930s, the company operated seven 
cargo vessels, all on a regular route between Houston and a home 
base in Philadelphia.
273
  Until the end of 1937, Southern Steamship’s 
“unlicensed seamen” were represented by the corrupt and ineffectual 
International Seaman’s Union (ISU), which by 1937 was withering in 
 
 267 See GROSS, supra note 110, at 13–16. 
 268 See id. (discussing some specific examples of this). 
 269 See id. at 83–84. 
 270 See, e.g., Threatens Labor Board; Thomas, Auto Union Head, Says Sitdowns May Be 
Used, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1941, at 19 (reporting “threat” by president of UAW to re-
vert to sit-down strikes to counter Board’s increasingly conservative approach). 
 271 See supra text accompanying notes 101–107. 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 108–115. 
 273 In re S. S.S. Co. (Southern Steamship), 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 27 (1940), enforced, 120 
F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). 
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the face of an increasingly effective NMU campaign to bring these 
workers within the CIO fold.
274
  In October of that year, the ISU des-
perately tried to preempt the NMU’s advances by petitioning the 
Board to hold elections at Southern Steamship and more than fifty 
other shipping lines.
275
  The NMU decisively won almost all of these 
elections, including the one at Southern Steamship, and in January 
1938, it was certified as the bargaining representative for Southern 
Steamship’s unlicensed personnel.276 
Following the pattern in basic industries, though, for the better 
part of a year after Board certification, Southern Steamship refused 
in any way to recognize the NMU.
277
  The company filed specious ob-
jections with the Board contesting the results of the election, but its 
main strategy was simply to ignore or refuse every request by the un-
ion to initiate bargaining.
278
  Finally, on July 17, 1938, NMU members 
of the freighter, City of Fort Worth, met in a Houston union hall with 
union officials and agreed to strike that vessel to protest the compa-
ny’s intransigence.279  The next morning, as the ship was at dock be-
ing readied to sail, thirteen seamen gathered on deck and refused to 
perform any further duties until the company agreed to bargain with 
the union.
280
  When the captain read them their shipping articles 
(traditional individual contracts for shipboard service), proclaimed 
the strike illegal under the terms of these documents, and ordered 
them back to work, the strikers responded by pointing out that the 
law was on their side. 
281
  In so doing, the sailors were actually repeat-
 
 274 White, supra note 3, at 315–17. 
 275 Id. at 318–19. 
 276 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 27; White, supra note 3, at 315, 318–19. 
 277 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 30–32. 
 278 Id.; Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner at 703, 705–07, S. S.S. Co. v. 
NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320).  Southern Steamship also 
refused to give NMU representatives boarding passes, without which they could not 
board the company’s vessels on which their members resided.  This would be one of 
several other grounds for finding the company in violation of the statute.  Southern 
Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 31. 
 279 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 32–33; Intermediate Report of Trial Examin-
er, supra note 278, at 707–09. 
 280 The thirteen represented the majority of the nineteen unlicensed seamen on 
board.  They had originally intended to shut off some of the ship’s systems when they 
struck, but evidently dropped this plan.  The only affirmative act of protest engaged 
in by the strikers occurred at the outset of the strike, when several of them refused to 
send steam to the deck machinery used to load cargo.  Intermediate Report of the 
Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 708–10. 
 281 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 33. 
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ing a contention that sit-down strikers had publically made in other 
cases, including the big Chrysler strike several years earlier.
282
 
The standoff continued peacefully throughout the rest of the 
day.
283
  By that evening, lawyers for the company and the union 
reached a settlement according to which the strikers agreed to 
resume their duties and the company agreed to commence collective 
bargaining and refrain from disciplining the strikers.
284
  The City of 
Fort Worth sailed for Philadelphia that night at its usual sailing time 
and there were no further disruptions during the voyage.
285
  In fact, 
the trial examiner described the strikers’ conduct during this passage 
as “exemplary.”286  But when the ship made port several days later, the 
captain fired five of the strikers.
287
  In response, all but one of the 
other participants in the original strikes struck the ship in protest—
this time in conventional fashion—and were themselves discharged.288 
The day after the discharges, the NMU filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against Southern Steamship, alleging that the company 
violated the Wagner Act by refusing to recognize and bargain with 
the union, interfering with the seamen’s rights of self-organization 
and collective bargaining, and discharging and refusing to reinstate 
the strikers.
289
  The regional director then filed formal complaints ad-
vancing all these charges as violations of NLRA sections 8(1), (3), and 
(5).
290
  Early in 1939, a trial examiner ruled against Southern Steam-
ship on every count and ordered, among other things, the reinstate-
ment of the discharged strikers.
291
  On the central issue of the legality 
of the strike, the trial examiner had to confront the claim that it was a 
sit-down strike and therefore unprotected under Fansteel.  In rejecting 
this argument, the trial examiner emphasized that the strikers had 
not taken possession of the vessel or interfered with its operation: 
“[t]hey merely refused to work, and if they did anything with the ves-
 
 282 Russell B. Porteb, Court Orders C.I.O. Strikers to Leave Chrysler Plants; Murphy 
Plans Enforcement,  N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16 1937, at 1; Union’s Letter to Murphy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 1937, at 30. 
 283 See Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 32–34. 
 284 Id. at 34. 
 285 Id. at 34–35; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 710–11. 
 286 Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 710–11. 
 287 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 35–36; Intermediate Report of Trial Examin-
er, supra note 278, at 711. 
 288 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 35. 
 289 Intermediate Report of the Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 705, 707. 
 290 Id. at 703. 
 291 Id. at 721–23. 
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sel it was in the interest of assuring its safety.”292  Moreover, the trial 
examiner refuted the company’s claim that the strike was prohibited 
by maritime law, emphasizing that the Wagner Act “does not exempt 
maritime employment” and that mutiny law therefore “must be read 
together with the provisions of the Act, which preserves the right to 
strike.”293  The trial examiner concluded, “This must be especially so 
when, as in this case, the strikes had been indubitably precipitated by 
unfair labor practices.”294 
Southern Steamship’s claim that the strike constituted a sit-down 
strike was also central to the Board’s review of the case.295  Despite the 
apparent cogency of the trial examiner’s analysis, the claim could not 
be dismissed out of hand.  The strike did occur on the property of 
the employer and was at least in violation of the strikers’ shipping ar-
ticles, if not an act of criminal mutiny.  For the Board, the differences 
between this case and Fansteel were decisive, and the Board unanim-
ously upheld the central findings of the trial examiner.
296
  The 
Board’s April 1940 decision noted not only that the alleged sit-down 
strike was clearly caused by Southern Steamship’s unlawful conduct, 
but also that the strike was peaceful, that it was never in defiance of 
an order to leave the ship, and that it never put the ship or its crew in 
any danger because it took place dockside.
297
  Once again adhering to 
the analysis of the trial examiner, the Board also pointed out that the 
strike could not be a sit-down strike in the sense of involving a tres-
pass to the company’s property because the ship was the strikers’ 
home.
298
  Although the strike contravened the shipping articles, the 
Board found that these were, in effect, individual employment con-
tracts that could not lawfully constrain the right to strike consistent 
with the Wagner and Norris-LaGuardia acts.
299
 
In one notable respect, the Board’s decision in this case went 
beyond its decision in Fansteel.  Here, the Board found that the com-
pany discharged some of the strikers solely because of their participa-
tion in the shipboard strike.
300
  The Board actually took a more blunt 
 
 292 Id. at 714. 
 293 Id. at 714–15. 
 294 Id. at 715. 
 295 In re S. S.S. Co. (Southern Steamship), 23 N.L.R.B. 26, 28, 36–38 (1940), enforced, 
120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316 U.S. 31 (1942). 
 296 See id. at 28–29. 
 297 Id. at 37–38. 
 298 Id. at 38. 
 299 Id. at 38–39. 
 300 Id. at 38. 
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view than the trial examiner, who had taken pains to show that the 
company’s discharges were illegal because they evidenced discrimina-
tion among the strikers.
301
  Because the Board viewed the strike as 
lawful, and because there were no other valid grounds for discharge, 
the discharges of the strikers were in themselves violations of law.
302
  
The Board upheld virtually all of the remedies ordered by the trial 
examiner, including the order that the company reinstate the dis-
charged seamen.
303
 
Southern Steamship appealed the Board’s decision to the Third 
Circuit.  In 1941, an en banc panel of that court found, in a four-to-
one vote, in favor of the Board on all key issues.
304
  At the center of 
the opinion was again the basic question of the strike’s legality.  
While admitting that the issue was clouded by both Fansteel and the 
traditional application of mutiny law to prohibit shipboard strikes, 
the court nevertheless refused to declare the strike illegal on either 
ground.
305
  Fansteel, it noted, involved an outright seizure of the 
workplace, violent defiance of the authorities’ attempts to oust the 
employees, and criminal contempt of a court order to evacuate the 
property—all elements absent from this case. 306  Moreover, while mu-
tiny law clearly prohibited shipboard strikes on a vessel at sea if such 
strikes were violent or involved an attempt to take possession of the 
ship or interfere with its operation, the law did not seem to apply to 
the case at hand because the circumstances were different in all these 
respects.
307
  In light of this ambiguity, the court reasoned, the labor 
law’s protection of basic labor rights—which made no exceptions for 
shipboard labor—should prevail.
308
 
The Supreme Court did not hear arguments in Southern Steam-
ship until February 1942,
309
 roughly two months after America’s entry 
to the Second World War.
310
  At the center of Southern Steamship’s 
 
 301 Compare Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 37–38 with Intermediate Report of 
Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 714–20. 
 302 Southern Steamship, 23 N.L.R.B. at 34–43. 
 303 Id. at 44–45, 47–48; Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner, supra note 278, at 
723–26. 
 304 S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 120 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1941), rev’d, 316 
U.S. 31 (1942). 
 305 Id. at 508–11. 
 306 Id. at 509. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 S. S.S. & Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 31 (1942). 
 310  Frank L. Kluckhohn, Unity in Congress; Only One Negative Vote as President Calls to 
War and Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1941, at 1. 
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argument to the Court was the claim that its ship’s officers held an 
inviolate authority, codified in the law of mutiny, to control workers 
aboard its vessels, and that the strikers illegally flouted this authority 
while the Board’s decision infringed upon it.
311
  For their part, both 
the Board and the NMU were, like the Third Circuit, keen to distin-
guish the case from Fansteel and to demonstrate that the federal mu-
tiny statute did not apply to circumstances such as these.
312
  Likewise, 
they stressed that if a strike such as the one in question were deemed 
unlawful under the Wagner Act, seamen would essentially lack an ef-
fective right to strike at all.
313
  For where could they strike in meaning-
ful fashion if not aboard ship? 
The Court’s repudiation of the Board and the union on these 
points would be every bit as complete as in Fansteel.  Writing for a five-
justice majority, Justice James Byrnes (who as a U.S. Senator pro-
posed anti-sit-down strike legislation
314
) opened his argument with an 
unqualified affirmation of the view that seamen are a dependent class 
of workers, forever subject to the authority of their “masters” aboard 
ship.
315
  From this vantage point, it was clear to Justice Byrnes that the 
strikers had committed mutiny; by their conduct, the strikers “under-
took to impose their will on the captain and officers.”
316
  As for the 
many grounds proffered by the Board and the union to question this 
conclusion and distinguish what happened aboard the City of Fort 
Worth from the more definite examples of mutiny, Justice Byrnes 
found these simply unworthy of attention.
317
 
Even more ominously for organized labor, Justice Byrnes re-
jected just as decisively the idea that the Board had any authority to 
square the interests and purposes of mutiny law with the Wagner 
Act.
318
  The Board argued to the Court that, even if the City of Fort 
Worth strike could be characterized as a mutiny, it was hardly an egre-
gious case of mutiny, and that in such circumstances the Board re-
tained the authority under the Wagner Act to order the strikers’ 
reinstatement.
319
  Justice Byrnes rejected this position categorically.  
While conceding the Board’s discretion to remedy unfair labor prac-
 
 311 Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 39–40. 
 312 Id. at 40. 
 313 See id. at 42–43. 
 314 Pope, supra note 3, at 93. 
 315 Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 38–39. 
 316 Id. at 41. 
 317 Id. passim. 
 318 Id. at 41–48. 
 319 Id. at 40. 
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tices, Justice Byrnes invoked Fansteel for the notion that “this discre-
tion has its limits, and we have already begun to define them.”
320
  The 
Board, he continued, simply could not undertake to accommodate 
labor rights in a manner that “ignore[d] other and equally important 
Congressional objectives.”
321
  That he conceived this proscription to 
cut in only one direction—to foreclose the enforcement of labor 
rights in order to accommodate the century-old mutiny law—was of 
no apparent concern to Justice Byrnes.  Nor was he moved in any way 
by the argument that this position would leave seamen with no mea-
ningful right to strike at all.  In Justice Byrnes’ view, such workers had 
the option to turn to the courts.
322
 
Justice Reed authored a brief dissent in Southern Steamship, which 
Justice Black, Justice Douglas, and Justice Murphy joined.  Reiterating 
some of the points made in his Fansteel dissent, Justice Reed’s central 
argument in Southern Steamship was that the majority excessively con-
strained the Board’s remedial authority, leaving in place an “iron rule 
that a discharge of a striker by his employer for some particular, un-
lawful conduct in furtherance of a strike is sufficient to bar his reins-
tatement as a matter of law.”
323
  Justice Reed noted, as he had in Fans-
teel, that this left the Board unable to craft meaningful remedies for 
an employer’s flagrant violations of the Wagner Act.
324
  The critical 
difference in this case, as he pointed out, was that the City of Fort 
Worth strike was devoid of the features on which Chief Justice Hughes 
relied to make his argument in Fansteel, such as seizure of property,  
violence,  resistance to the judicial authority and the efforts of law en-
forcement, and criminal prosecution.
325
 
Above all else, Southern Steamship constituted an extension of 
Fansteel’s anti-strike jurisprudence.  This is evident in two principal 
ways.  First, and perhaps most plainly, Southern Steamship in effect ex-
panded the definition of the sit-down strike to strikes that do not fea-
ture outright seizure of property, violence, defiance of legal process, 
or actual prosecution.  Of course, that case did involve a peculiar le-
gal circumstance (the application of federal mutiny law in the mari-
time context) and a determination by the Court that the strikers’ 
putative violation of the mutiny law mandated a limitation of the 
 
 320 Id. at 46. 
 321 Southern Steamship, 316 U.S. at 47. 
 322 Id. at 48–49. 
 323 Id. at 51 (Reed, J., dissenting). 
 324 Id. at 50. 
 325 Id. at 49–51. 
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Board’s remedial authority.  But there is nothing about the Court’s 
opinion limiting its basic logic to maritime cases.  As subsequent de-
velopments in the law (which we shall consider below) reveal, the 
broad definition of sit-down strikes is a definite part of Southern Steam-
ship’s enduring legacy.  Workers who engage in such strikes forfeit 
any right to benefit from Board remedies with little further inquiry 
into their actual conduct during the protest. 
The second and related consequence of Southern Steamship, 
which has proved just as significant, is its notion that the illegality of a 
strike as such—apart from its character as a sit-down strike—
necessarily precludes reinstatement of workers involved in the strike, 
even when the employer causes the entire affair.  Southern Steamship 
brought this out even more clearly than Fansteel, not only because the 
strike itself was so tame by comparison, but because of the Board’s 
more focused effort in Southern Steamship to find an unfair labor prac-
tice in the discharges themselves.  Doing so framed the issue squarely 
as whether an employer may fire workers who engage in an illegal 
strike without the firing itself constituting a violation of the labor law.  
The Court’s answer was clear: workers who engage in such strikes may 
not benefit from the Board’s remedial authority and are thus unpro-
tected by the labor law.  And again, whether this leaves such workers 
with no meaningful right to strike at all, or whether it allows employ-
ers to benefit from their own unlawful provocations, is, according to 
Southern Steamship, essentially irrelevant. 
It remained for the courts and the Board in the aftermath of 
Fansteel and Southern Steamship to determine exactly what circums-
tances would bring these doctrines to bear.  Clearly, classic sit-down 
strikes, as now more broadly defined by the Court, would fall into this 
category.  So too would strikes, like Southern Steamship, that either of-
fended federal law directly or that called for remedies requiring the 
Board, in that Court’s view, to “ignore other and equally important 
Congressional objectives.”
326
  But without laying out the relevant pa-
rameters, these cases pointed to other circumstances that would 
render a strike illegal and disentitle its participants to the protections 
of labor law.  In particular, to the extent that the criminality of the 
strikes in Fansteel and Southern Steamship was part of the reason their 
participants lost the protections of labor law, then how far did this 
precept extend?  Under what other circumstances, beyond sit-down 
strikes and maritime “mutinies,” would the criminal nature of a strike 
render its participants outside the protections of labor law?  Moreo-
 
 326 Id. at 47 (majority opinion). 
WHITE (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2010  12:28 PM 
48 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
ver, to the extent that Southern Steamship also suggested that mere 
conflict with important federal policies justified a withdrawal of pro-
tections, would conflict with state law and policies have the same ef-
fect?  Related to this is yet another question posed more directly in 
Fansteel but left unanswered in that case: if state authorities in that 
case could, without opposition from the Board or the courts, carry 
out the criminal prosecution of strikers obviously attempting to vin-
dicate their rights under labor law, when would labor rights ever ac-
tually take precedence over the prerogative to criminal prosecution, 
whether state or federal?  Over the half-century or so after these cases 
were decided, the courts, the Board, and Congress drew explicitly on 
Fansteel and Southern Steamship to answer this question and in the 
process make significant inroads on the right to strike. 
B. Sit-Down Strikes and the Lead-up to the Taft-Hartley Act 
After the Supreme Court decision in Southern Steamship, sit-down 
strikes continued to take place, albeit almost certainly in smaller 
numbers.  The Chicago area offers a number of examples.  In No-
vember 1942 some 500 leather workers in Chicago engaged in a 
“brief” sit-down before leaving the factory after being told by an offic-
er on the police labor detail to “work or get out.”
327
  The same Chica-
go officer, George Barnes, responded to a sit-down at a Ford facility 
in December 1943, and in June 1944 he led a detail that “ejected” 130 
workers at a wallpaper factory who were striking to protest their em-
ployer’s favoritism in their union’s jurisdictional dispute with an AFL 
affiliate.
328
  The following April, CIO steel workers in Chicago and 
Gary, Indiana, launched numerous quickie sit-down strikes to shut 
down their employers’ operations in protest of inadequate processing 
of grievances.
329
  That October, a sit-down at one of the same steel 
mills was ended when plant guards forced the strikers out.
330
  These 
sit-downs were but the most prominent of hundreds of wildcat and 
quickie strikes to affect area steel mills during the war years.
331
 
Similar protests occurred elsewhere.  Some of these involved 
large numbers of workers.  In June 1944, some 600 CIO textile work-
ers in Passaic, New Jersey, engaged in a sit-down strike of several days 
 
 327 500 in Leather Plant Sit-Down, Then Walk Out, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 18, 1942, at 
2. 
 328 Police Rout 130 Sit-Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 2, 1944, at 22; 
650 Quit Jobs Over 2 Jobs in Ford War Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 2, 1943, at 2. 
 329 Sit-Downs Slow Flow of Steel 8 Times in Day, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 26, 1943, at 8. 
 330 Sitdown Strike Group Ejected at Steel Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 8, 1943, at 7. 
 331 Gary Sitdown Halts 190 Cars of War Metal, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 10, 1945, at 21. 
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duration.
332
  A year later, more than 1000 steel workers mounted an 
overnight sit-down in Philadelphia.
333
  A few weeks later, Philadelphia 
hosted another sit-down, as 500 machinists struck the Link Belt Com-
pany.
334
  In September of 1945, a sit-down strike briefly shut down 
Jones & Laughlin’s Pittsburgh area mill.
335
  Similarly, in March, 1946, 
some 900 employees of Diamond T Motor Car in Chicago undertook 
a sit-down strike to protest the company’s layoff of union officers to 
accommodate returning veterans.
336
  The following April, “hundreds” 
of female cannery workers loyal to the CIO mounted a sit-down in 
Sacramento to protest attempts by a Teamsters local union to prema-
turely assert representation over them.
337
 
Remarkably, strikes of this kind continued through 1947, even as 
Congress drafted and debated the Taft-Hartley Act.  In February of 
that year, thirteen miners struck for sixty hours inside a Hazelton, 
Pennsylvania, coal mine to win a grievance against their employer.
338
  
In June, quickie sit-downs were reported at automobile plants in De-
troit.
339
 Also in June, NMU sailors engaged in a huge sit-down strike 
involving thousands of sailors on some 700 ships.
340
  That fall, just af-
ter the enactment of Taft-Hartley, another sit-down was reported in 
Brooklyn, New York, where CIO warehouse workers used the strategy 
to try to impede their employer’s effort to replace them with AFL 
members.
341
  The Brooklyn strike is particularly notable as the strikers 
held the factory for several days before surrendering.
342
 
Although even less comprehensive than newspaper accounts, 
Board decisions from this period also confirm a number of sit-down 
 
 332 600 on Sit-Down Strike, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1944, at 10. 
 333 Defy Law by Strike: Steelworkers Vote to Tie Up 3 Philadelphia Plants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 1945, at 4; 1,600 in SKF Sit-Down, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1945, at 2. 
 334 1,250 Strikers Swell Philadelphia Tie-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1945, at 12. 
 335 Other Developments in Labor Relations: Strike of 60 Rail Workers Forces Jones & 
Laughlin to Halt Operations, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1945, at 2. 
 336 George Hartmann, 900 in Sitdown Fight Rehiring Policy on Vets, CHI. DAILY TRIB., 
Mar. 2, 1946, at 9. 
 337 CIO Groups Parade at Struck Canneries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1946, at 15. 
 338 13 Win Docked Pay, End Mine Sitdown, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1947, at 38. 
 339 Detroit Walkouts Make 20,000 Idle, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at 20. 
 340 CIO Maritime Strike Ties Up 700 Ships, Curran Says; Men on Board, WALL ST. J., 
June 17, 1947, at 2. 
 341 No Workers Report at Container Plant After Fight with CIO Pickets in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1947, at 23; Picket Line Broken at Strike-Shut Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
1947, at 31. 
 342 80 on Sitdown Strike; Wives Pass Food in, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 15, 1947, at 12. 
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strikes,
343
 including an eight-day sit-down strike in 1944 by communi-
cations workers in Elyria, Ohio.
344
  The persistence of sit-down strikes 
in this period is likewise verified by their occasional mention in court 
decisions during this period, albeit usually not as the chief issue in 
dispute.
345
 
As in the period between Fansteel and Southern Steamship, a pri-
mary cause of sit-down strikes in the period after Southern Steamship 
was the continued resistance of many employers to their most basic 
obligations under the Wagner Act.
346
  The strikes were also launched 
as a means of prosecuting grievances and other, more run-of-the mill 
conflicts that arose regularly in the course of union representation.
347
  
Alongside these causes were jurisdictional conflicts between AFL and 
CIO unions, whose bitter rivalry very often implicated employers bi-
ased in favor of AFL affiliates.
348
  In all these contexts, though, the 
central factor in the unions’ resort to the sit-downs strikes remained 
the advantages that the tactic afforded in countering employers’ 
strike-negating prerogative to continue production during a strike, 
which the Supreme Court had already endorsed in the 1938 decision, 
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. NLRB.
349
 
Another reason the strikes remained relatively common was the 
Board’s continued adherence to a realistic view that Fansteel and 
Southern Steamship did not repeal the right to strike or reduce its law-
ful form to a mere symbol; instead, the Board sought to chart a com-
promise between the holding of these cases and the basic rights of la-
bor as protected by the statute.  The Board had always taken a dim 
view of excessively violent and blatantly unlawful behavior by strikers, 
expressing this view, as we have seen, in its litigation of the sit-down 
strike cases themselves; after Southern Steamship, its scrutiny of such 
 
 343 In many of these cases, the sit-down strike was tangential to the issues before 
the Board.  See, e.g., In re Heisler Mfg. Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1143 (1946); In re 
Bergmann’s Inc., 71 N.L.R.B. 1020, 1032 n.15 (1946). 
 344 See, e.g., In re Elyria Tel. Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1945). 
 345 See, e.g., NLRB v. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir. 1944) (using 
a 1943 sit-down strike of elevator operators as background in an NLRB enforcement 
action against an employer). 
 346 See, e.g., Police Rout 130 Sit-Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, supra note 328; Sit-downs 
Slow Flow of Steel 8 Times in Day, supra note 329. 
 347 See, e.g., Hartmann, supra note 336; Gary Sitdown Halts 190 Cars of War Metal, 
supra note 331. 
 348 See FINE, supra note 1, at 73–79; Police Rout 130 Sit Strikers; AFL Accuses CIO, su-
pra note 328. 
 349 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). 
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behavior was even more exacting.
350
  Nevertheless, as in the wake of 
Fansteel, the Board declined automatically to deny workers the protec-
tions of the labor law simply because something resembling a sit-
down strike was alleged by the employer or the press or played a mi-
nor role amidst a complicated labor dispute.  Instead, the Board 
looked to the nature of the action and paid special attention to 
whether “employees took possession of the plant, withheld it against 
the wishes of the respondent [employer], or had to be forcibly 
ejected.”
351
 
Of particular significance to this position was NLRB v. American 
Manufacturing Company, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit validated the Board’s view that not all strike activity on 
company property necessarily constituted an illegal sit-down strike.
352
  
Through the 1940s, the Board cited American Manufacturing several 
times to support similar administrative rulings.
353
  Significantly, the 
Board’s approach to sit-down strikes accompanied its efforts in the 
late 1930s and 1940s to distinguish acts of picket-line violence or oth-
er strike-related “misconduct” that justified discharge from those that 
did not and would admit reinstatement.
354
  A key feature of this poli-
cy, which was reflected in its decision in Republic Steel and would for a 
time frame the development of law in this area, was the Board’s un-
willingness either to investigate or to presume criminal culpability—
and therefore ineligibility for reinstatement—where an employee had 
not been found guilty by criminal trial or plea.
355
 
In fact, even as sit-down strikes and other sensational acts of la-
bor militancy became rarer, mass-picketing and more mundane 
forms of strike-related violence and criminality remained common 
features of labor conflict.  In quite a few cases in the 1940s, strikers 
organized huge protests of over 1000 picketers, who harangued and 
intimidated company managers and would-be crossovers and re-
 
 350 See, e.g., In re Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 912, 930–32 (1944). 
 351 In re Nat’l Container Corp., 57 N.L.R.B. 565, 585 (1944); see also In re Draper 
Corp., 52 N.L.R.B. 1477, 1493 (1943) (considering the same factors). 
 352 106 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 353 See, e.g., In re Draper, 52 N.L.R.B. at 1493; In re W. Cartridge Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 
434, 454 (1943). 
 354 See, e.g., In re Ind. Desk Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 76, 96 (1944); In re Berkshire Knitting 
Mills, 17 N.L.R.B. 239, 291–92 (1939); In re Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 
387–88 (1938), enforced as modified, 107 F.2d 472 (3d Cir. 1939), modified, 311 U.S. 7 
(1940). 
 355 Walter Daykin, Treatment of Violence in Labor Disputes, 26 IOWA L. REV. 772, 777–
78 (1941).  For examples, see In re Swift & Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 991, 1010 (1939); In re 
Republic Steel, 9 N.L.R.B. at 387–88 (1938). 
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placement workers.
356
  Not infrequently, protests of this kind culmi-
nated in court injunctions, violent confrontations, and mass arrests.
357
  
A notable example is the 1946 strike at tractor and machine maker 
Allis-Chalmers (centered at its complex in West Allis, Wisconsin) that 
featured thousands of picketers, numerous violent clashes, and hun-
dreds of arrests.
358
  The strike would assume a prominent place in 
subsequent congressional efforts to amend the labor law—even 
though the many arrests in this case gave more witness to how free 
courts and prosecutors already were to enjoin and prosecute workers 
who embraced mass picketing and other confrontational methods.
359
  
As we shall see, even as the Board struggled to develop an approach 
that would preserve basic labor rights amidst such tumult (which, as 
with sit-down strikes, was often instigated by employers in the first 
place) without seeming to suggest the Board’s approval of union-
sponsored violence and disorder, these tactics quickly joined the sit-
down strikes as the focus of conservative criticism of the Board’s sup-
posed contempt for court decisions.
360
 
Though quite justifiable as a sound exercise in the realistic and 
pragmatic use of its administrative authority, the Board’s approach to 
 
 356 See, e.g., 8,000 Men Walk Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1941, at 1; 5,000 Pickets to Mass 
Today at Columbia, Strikers Report, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1946, at 1; 1,000 in Picket Line in 
Midtown Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1942, at 12; Pickets Are Routed by Police in Yonkers; 
Demonstration at Grant Street Broken Up, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1941, at 52; A.H. Raskin, 
200,000 Quit in 16 States; Mass Picketing is Started, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1946, at 1. 
 357 See, e.g., Film Studio Strike Settled; 400 Arrested on Final Day, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
1945, at 1; 4 Hurt in Detroit Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1947, at 2; George Hartmann, 
Sheriff Offers Evanston Aid in Curbing Pickets, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 9, 1946, at 12; Limit 
of 21 Pickets at Plant Ordered in Writ Against Union, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 22, 1946, at 2; 
New CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 26, 1946, at 1; Pickets Are 
Routed by Police in Yonkers; Demonstration at Grant Store Broken Up, supra note 356; A.H. 
Raskin, Clash in GE Strike Brings 19 Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1946, at 17; 700 Film 
Strike Pickets Arrested; Police Disperse 1,500 at Columbia; New Demonstration Ordered Today, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1946, at 1 [hereinafter 700 Film Strike Pickets Arrested]; Violence 
Flares at Yale & Towne, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1946, at 1; Will Resume Picketing; Kentucky 
Telephone Strikers Act Despite Arrest of 151, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1947, at 4; W.U. Asks 
Court Aid as Police Battle Pickets, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 26, 1946, at 3. 
 358 CIO Mobs Blockade Plant; Hurl Barrage of Rocks Thru Allis Windows, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Oct. 29, 1946, at 1; New CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant, supra note 357; Riot-
ing CIO Mob Battles Police at Allis Plant; 4 Hurt and 46 Arrested in New Demonstration, 
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 5, 1946, at 6; 75 Injured in Allis Rioting; 1,200 Battle Police; Autos 
Tipped, Burned, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 10, 1946, at 1. The conflict with Allis-Chalmers 
in 1946 was the culmination of a concerted strategy of company resistance to left-
leaning UAW organizers’ efforts  to unionize the plant.  ZIEGER, supra note 1, at 126–
28. 
 359 See infra note 397. 
 360 GROSS, supra note 110, passim. 
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such cases proved unacceptable in conservative circles and to the 
courts.  Notwithstanding the Second Circuit’s approval in American 
Manufacturing and similar decisions in other circuits,
361
 many courts 
rejected the Board’s textured view of sit-down strikes and related 
conduct.
362
  Even more significantly, the Board’s realism quickly at-
tracted the hostile attention of congressional conservatives, for whom 
it informed a broader effort to transform both the politics of the 
Board and the substance of the Wagner Act.
363
 
This effort would soon change the Board entirely, as the con-
servatives convinced President Roosevelt to replace three members 
(Donald Wakefield Smith in 1939, Chairman Madden in 1940, and 
Edwin Smith in 1941) who had been extremely important to develop-
ing the Board’s early program.
364
  Although these men were replaced 
by relatively moderate members, this drive to transform the Board 
would continue until, by the time of Taft-Hartley, conservatives dom-
inated the Board.
365
  Significantly, these changes in membership were 
but the most notable expression of a far more comprehensive effort 
to purge the whole agency of people identified by business groups or 
conservatives in the labor movement as too supportive of industrial 
unionism, political progressivism, or a robust view of labor rights 
more generally.
366
 
In 1939, the House of Representatives convened a special com-
mittee to investigate the NLRB.
367
  Chaired by Howard K. Smith, a 
reactionary from Virginia, the “Smith Committee” represented the 
first important congressional attack on the Board and the Wagner 
Act, which, despite disquiet with the direction of labor politics, had 
up to that point remained largely invulnerable amidst the tumultuous 
and complex politics of the Second New Deal.
368
  The committee em-
barked on a sweeping investigation of the Board’s policies, personnel, 
 
 361 See, e.g., NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167, 176–77 (3d Cir. 1939) 
(distinguishing Fansteel and upholding Board-ordered reinstatement where violence 
was minimal, mutually instigated, and attenuated from strike). 
 362 See, e.g., In re Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 204–05 (4th Cir. 1944); In re Clin-
chfield Coal Corp., 145 F.2d 66, 72–73 (4th Cir. 1944); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 120 
F.2d 913, 925 (7th Cir. 1941); Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 411, 
415 (5th Cir. 1938); Standard Lime & Stone Co. v. NLRB, 97 F.2d 531, 536 (4th Cir. 
1938). 
 363 GROSS, supra note 110, at 79, 85–93, 100–08. 
 364 Id. at 78–79, 211–13, 238–39. 
 365 Id. at 232–40. 
 366 Id. at 131–50. 
 367 Id. at 151. 
 368 Id. at 151–59. 
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and ideological orientation; its purported areas of focus fell into four 
main categories of supposed impropriety: “Anti-American affiliations 
and associations of Board personnel”; “extra-legal actions” by the 
Board; improper “interpretations of the act” by Board members; and 
improper enforcement of the act by Board personnel.
369
  Besides the 
obvious aim of undermining the Board’s legitimacy and forcing 
changes in its composition, the committee’s work was also geared to 
generating a package of proposed amendments to the Act and a 
record to support their passage.
370
 
The Smith Committee enjoyed almost unlimited access to Board 
files, gathered thousands of questionnaires, and interviewed under 
oath and in open hearings scores of Board personnel, experts in law 
and industrial relations, employers, and union officials.
371
  Although 
occasionally concerned with actual instances of abuse or impropriety, 
the committee’s efforts mainly involved mining the Board’s cases and 
records for complex situations and exigent circumstances that could 
be manipulated to cast the agency and its staff as biased or incompe-
tent.
372
  At perhaps its worst, the committee’s efforts devolved into an 
attempt to sully the Board for having (for the time) an inordinately 
high number of professional women on its staff.
373
 
The Board’s approach to sit-down strikes was an area of special 
concern to the committee.  The transcripts and records of the com-
mittee’s hearings, which run to nearly 8000 pages, are peppered with 
references to and inquiries about Fansteel as well as Republic Steel.
374
  
The Smith Committee’s final report—which historian James Gross 
aptly characterizes as a thoroughly “one-sided and often distorted ap-
praisal”
375
—condemned the Board’s position in Fansteel as “unto-
ward,” “strange,” and thoroughly illegitimate.
376
  Worse, the report 
claimed, the Board seemed not to have abandoned this “reprehensi-
ble policy,” as evidenced by the fact that it attempted to distinguish 
Fansteel in another case, McNeely & Price, in which the employer had 
not actually discharged the sit-down strikers but instead discriminated 
among them, and which was still being litigated when Fansteel was de-
 
 369 H.R. REP. NO. 76-3109, at 5, 62, 96 (1940). 
 370 GROSS, supra note 110, at 187. 
 371 Id. at 156–60, 164–71. 
 372 Id. at 173–75, 193. 
 373 Id. at 181–83. 
 374 Hearings Before Spec. Comm. to Investigate the National Labor Relations Board, 76th 
Cong. 675, 1647, 2512–15, 3412–13, 4890–91, 4983–84, 7283 (1940). 
 375 GROSS, supra note 110, at 203. 
 376 H.R. REP. NO. 76-3109, at 81 (1941). 
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cided.
377
  Perhaps most significantly, the committee’s criticisms of the 
Board seem to have had less to do with the intransigent and suppo-
sedly duplicitous quality of the Board’s decision making, or the fear 
that it would defiantly protect sit-down strikes of the classic sort, than 
with its efforts to justify, on any grounds, the reinstatement of strikers 
who engaged in any kind of conduct (including violent or illegal 
conduct) that fundamentally challenged employers’ traditional he-
gemony in the workplace. 
This appeal to Fansteel to rationalize a broader attack on the 
right to strike was clearly borne out in the suite of amendments to the 
Wagner Act that the committee recommended, which among other 
things would have revised section 2(3) of the Act to disqualify from 
reinstatement anyone “who engaged in violence or unlawful destruc-
tion or seizure of property in connection with any labor dispute or 
unfair labor practice.”
378
  So broad was this language that in a differ-
ent context it caused William Green of the AFL to qualify his 
erstwhile support for the committee’s work, as Green correctly per-
ceived that such language would jeopardize the right to strike in any 
contentious setting.
379
 
At nearly the same time that the Smith Committee embarked on 
its investigations of the Board, so too did the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor in the course of considering a suite of bills to 
amend the Act that were roughly akin to the Smith bill.  Although 
quite a bit less sensational and one-sided than the House hearings, 
and ultimately less influential to the course of labor law and policy, 
the Senate hearings did go to great lengths to criticize the Board, in 
that senators repeatedly challenged Board members and staff to ex-
plain the agency’s approach to sit-down strikes, particularly during 
their height in 1937 and 1938.
380
  Opponents of the Board (and the 
 
 377 A panel of the Third Circuit strongly rebuked the Board for attempting, in 
answering the company’s appeal, to distinguish the facts in McNeely from Fansteel.  
McNeely & Price Co. v. NLRB, 106 F.2d 878, 878–79 (3d Cir. 1939).  Other circuits 
took a very different view of this issue.  See, e.g., Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 
114 F.2d 849, 858 (7th Cir. 1940). 
 378 GROSS, supra note 110, at 199.  The statute would also have dramatically altered 
the structure of the NLRB, changed the way the Board determined bargaining units 
and conducted elections, limited the scope of the duty to bargain, provided for more 
exacting judicial review of Board decisions, protected employers’ right to make anti-
union statements, and rewritten the preamble of the Act, replacing its pro-
unionization language with more “neutral” text. Id. at 196–99. 
 379 Id. at 207. 
 380 Hearings Before S. Comm. on Education and Labor on Legis. to Amend the National 
Labor Relations Act, 76th Cong. 15, 63, 117–18, 425, 481–82, 1600–01, 2300, 2455–72 
(1939) [hereinafter Hearings on NLRA Amendments]. 
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CIO) from industry, labor, and Congress were allowed to repeatedly 
accuse the Board of ignoring the Court’s decision in Fansteel.
381
  More 
ominously, this criticism also entailed a charge that the Board was apt 
to continue to ignore Fansteel by taking a critical, case-by-case ap-
proach to reinstatement in cases involving strike-related violence—
and that the Act should therefore be amended to categorically ban 
reinstatement in such cases.
382
  The next year, the committee consi-
dered still more legislation to amend the Act and transform the 
Board, thus revisiting the surrounding sit-down strikes and the 
Board’s reaction to them in light of Supreme Court precedent.
383
 
However disreputable its methods, the Smith Committee’s ef-
forts to undermine the Board and generate support to transform the 
agency and the Wagner Act paid off in spades, as both the public and 
the Congress became significantly more receptive to such legisla-
tion.
384
  In the summer of 1940, the House passed the Smith Commit-
tee’s bill by a wide majority (258 to 129).
385
  The Smith bill died, how-
ever, when the Senate Education and Labor Committee refused to 
act on it.
386
  Nevertheless, the death of this bill did not end the effort 
to amend the Wagner Act, nor did it prevent conservatives from seek-
ing a more comprehensive roll-back of the right to strike and of labor 
rights more broadly.  Indeed, in these respects, the Smith Commit-
tee’s efforts were only the beginning. 
C. The Sit-Down Strikes and the Taft-Hartley Act 
Through the early 1940s, opponents of the Wagner Act contin-
ued to propose legislation to repeal or transform the statute; in the 
ten years between Jones & Laughlin and Taft-Hartley, around 200 bills 
were introduced in Congress with that aim.
387
  At the center of this 
legislative agenda remained the goals that were first cultivated by the 
Smith Committee: changing the basic substance of the Act itself to 
narrow the definition of employer unfair labor practices, adding un-
ion unfair labor practices, and altering the structure of the NLRB and 
the manner in which it handled both union elections and unfair la-
 
 381 Id. at 1072–74, 2455–72, 2474, 2030. 
 382 See Id. at 63, 86–87, 198–215, 296, 520, 1498–500, 1507–08, 2128, 2138–39, 
2474. 
 383 See Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 9195, 76th Cong. 
100, 178, 219, 221, 246–48 (1940). 
 384 GROSS, supra note 110, at 187. 
 385 Id. at 210. 
 386 Id. at 210–11. 
 387 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 333. 
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bor practice complaints against employers.
388
  While none of these 
bills was enacted, the Smith bill itself would form the template for the 
Taft-Hartley Act, which would dramatically transform American labor 
law and labor relations.
389
 
It is common to explain Taft-Hartley as a reaction to the dramat-
ic expansion of union power that occurred in the wake of the Wagner 
Act and as a response to the sense that this power was being abused 
and needed regulation.
390
  This account has some appeal in view of 
the huge gains in union membership during this period, as well as 
the enormous strike waves that occurred during and after the Second 
World War, and it is probably at least partially accurate.  But the fact 
that Taft-Hartley so faithfully adhered to the agenda developed by the 
Smith Committee shows very clearly that the statute was rooted in the 
current of organized anti-unionism that underlay the great wave of 
sit-down strikes of 1937 and 1938 and that persisted through the 
1940s.  Further evidence of this connection appears in the fact that 
the very same coalition of business groups, conservative unionists, 
and reactionary politicians who spearheaded the earlier attempts at 
“reform” also played the lead role in enacting Taft-Hartley.
391
  This 
coalition was in no way satisfied by the rightward shift of the Board 
and its policies in the period during and after the Smith Committee 
investigations, nor was it content with the enactment of numerous 
state laws during this period that limited the right to strike (including 
barring sit-down strikes) and otherwise “equalized” the rights of labor 
and capital, which in many cases were directed specifically at regulat-
ing sit-down strikes and punishing strikers for strike-related vi-
olence.
392
 
Supporters of Taft-Hartley relentlessly constructed images of the 
Board and the Wagner Act as complicit in a perverted and out-of-
control system of labor relations desperately in need of reform.  To 
this end, they invoked Fansteel and Southern Steamship not simply for 
what these cases seemed to say about sit-down strikes, but as mandates 
against strike-related violence, wildcat strikes, and mass picketing, as 
well as grounds for indicting the Board’s purported indulgence of 
such conduct.  This claim was built, in part, on another series of in-
vestigations of the Board itself by House and Senate committees, in-
 
 388 GROSS, supra note 110, at 252–53. 
 389 Id. at 253. 
 390 See, e.g., MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 272. 
 391 Id. at 346–62. 
 392 Id. at 320–21, 323–25, 327; Harry A. Millis & Harold A. Katz, A Decade of State 
Labor Legislation, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 282, 283, 290, 301–04 (1947). 
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cluding pointed questioning of the Board’s conservative chairman, 
Paul Herzog, regarding the Board’s fidelity to Southern Steamship.
393
  
Even more cutting was the report of the House Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor on the lead bill in that chamber, which grudgingly 
confessed that Fansteel and Southern Steamship had some effect on 
Board policy.  But this, the report asserted, was “very recent, inspired, 
it seems, by the public demand for fair labor regulation.”
394
  The re-
port continued: 
In cases involving violence in strikes, the Board has seemed reluc-
tant to follow the decisions of the courts.  It is inclined to reins-
tate, with back pay, strikers whom employers discharge for what 
the Board seems to regard as minor crimes, such as interfering 
with the United States mail, obstructing railroad right-of-way, dis-
charging firearms, rioting, carrying concealed weapons, malicious 
destruction of property, and assault and battery.
395
 
This interpretation of Fansteel and Southern Steamship to justify 
broader attacks on the right to strike was also backed by extensive 
and well cultivated testimony on strike violence, mass picketing, wild-
cat strikes, and claims that existing laws and processes were inade-
quate to deal with these problems.  The House committee stands out 
in this regard, as it repeatedly allowed company executives and man-
agers, congressmen, conservative unionists, and the occasional work-
er to present such conduct as common features of post-Wagner Act 
labor relations.
396
  The 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike was singled out, 
along with a couple of other disputes, and mined for shocking infor-
mation of this sort.
397
  Similarly extensive testimony was adduced on 
mass picketing that occurred in a strike that same year at Detroit 
Steel Products, which included picketing of a company manager’s 
home.
398
  For good measure, the House committee inserted into its 
record a great number of evocative photographs of strike violence 
and mass picketing from these and other strikes.
399
  Hearings before 
 
 393 See Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Education & Labor on Bills to Amend and Re-
peal the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong. 3108–09 (1947) [hereinafter House 
Hearings on Taft-Hartley]. 
 394 H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 27 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 318 (1948). 
 395 Id. 
 396 House Hearings on Taft-Hartley, supra note 393, at 4, 29–32, 109, 424, 984, 2144–
50, 2170, 2530. 
 397 Id. at 1359–74; see also id. at 263–332 (discussing 1946 Pennsylvania brewers 
strike). 
 398 Id. at 445–74. 
 399 Id. at 222, 461–63, 1436–42. 
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the Senate Labor and Public Welfare committee developed a similar, 
albeit somewhat less sensational, record.
400
 
Congress drew on these records to justify dramatic proposals to 
change the statute.  Most striking among these was section 12 of the 
bill favored by the House, H.R. 3020, which would have created an 
array of “unlawful concerted activities,” defined in large part to in-
clude violent or threatening strike activity; “any sympathy strike, ju-
risdictional strike, monopolistic strike, or illegal boycott, or any sit-
down strike or other concerted interference with an employer’s op-
erations conducted by remaining on the employer’s premises;” or any 
wildcat or quickie-type sit-down strike.
401
 Such conduct would have 
been made enjoinable by federal courts, notwithstanding the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
402
  Workers found to have committed any such con-
duct would have lost the protections of the statute and faced individ-
ual damage liability.
403
 
While this broadside attack on the right to strike did not survive 
harmonization with the lead Senate bill,
404
 other sanctions on conduct 
by unions and their agents and limits on Board remedial authority, 
which were also included in early versions of the Senate legislation, 
did appear in the final act.
405
  Particularly notable in this regard is a 
provision eventually enacted as section 8(b)(1)(A), which deemed it 
an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents to “restrain or 
coerce” employees in their exercise of the right (accorded by 
amendments to section 7) to refrain from union membership; as well 
as limits imposed by amendments to section 10(c) on the Board’s 
power to reinstate or grant back pay awards to workers fired “for 
cause.”
406
 Although not as explicit or as extreme as the provisions on 
unlawful concerted activity in the House bill, the section 8(b)(1)(A) 
and 10(c) provisions were also clearly intended to work together to 
redress the Board’s supposed infidelity to the spirit of Fansteel and 
Southern Steamship.  Section 8(b)(1)(A)’s ambiguous terms on coer-
 
 400 See Hearings Before S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 44–50, 945–
46, 966–67, 1716–18, 1732 (1947). 
 401 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. (1st Sess. 1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 
158, 205. 
 402 Id. at 206. 
 403 Id. 
 404 H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 58–59 (1947) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, su-
pra note 394, at 505, 562–63. 
 405 Id. 
 406  H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 27, 42, 52–53, 58 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra 
note 394, at 292, 318, 333, 343–44, 349. 
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cion and restraint were fully intended to prohibit all manner of con-
duct, including not only sit-down strikes but mass picketing and pick-
et-line violence more broadly.
407
  Although the final version of the Act 
did not explicitly provide for punishing a violation of section 
8(b)(1)(A) by disqualifying the responsible worker or workers from 
reinstatement, and only imposed liability on unions and their agents, 
the bill’s authors made clear their intention that section 10(c) be 
read together with section 8(b)(1)(A) to have precisely that effect.
408
  
At the same time, the amended section 10(c)’s limitations on reins-
tatement and back pay were not confined to conduct constituting un-
fair labor practices; instead, the provision was intended more broadly 
to bar such remedies in any case involving sit-down strikes, strikes fea-
turing violence or criminality, or mass picketing.
409
  Whatever the me-
chanism, the proponents of these changes candidly anticipated that 
the thrust of these limits on Board remedies would be to deny the of-
fending workers the basic rights otherwise accorded them in sections 
7 and 13.  In fact, for good measure, the drafters subtly transformed 
the right to strike language in section 13, qualifying the right as 
granted by the Wagner Act with the terms, “except as specifically pro-
vided for herein.”
410
 
The amendments were perceived in the same light by Taft-
Hartley’s opponents in Congress, who criticized the section 
8(b)(1)(A) provision in terms directed at similar provisions proposed 
by the Smith Committee, such as requiring the Board to “take over 
local police functions” best left to traditional, local processes of law.
411
  
In similar resonance with earlier debates, opponents criticized sec-
tion 10(c) as preventing the Board from making equitable decisions 
in cases that involved mutual misconduct or even employer provoca-
tion.
412
 
 
 407 MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 127, at 445–47. 
 408 H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 38–39, 42 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra 
note 394, at 505, 542–43, 546; see also S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 50 (1947), reprinted in 1 
NLRB, supra note 394, at 456 (providing supplemental views). 
 409 See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 42, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 292, 
333; H.R. REP. NO. 80-510, at 1, 38–39, 55 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra 
note 394, at 505, 542–43, 559. 
 410 See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006). 
 411 See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 64, 82–83, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 
292, 355, 373–74. 
 412  H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 1, 64, 91–92, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 
292, 355, 382–83; S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 1, 21–22, reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, 
at 463, 483–84. 
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IV. MILITANCY PROHIBITED: THE SIT-DOWN STRIKES’ LEGACY IN 
MODERN LABOR LAW AND LABOR RELATIONS 
The framework of legal opposition to the sit-down strikes that 
emerged in the years between the Fansteel strike and the passage of 
Taft-Hartley has had a lasting effect on American labor relations, cen-
tered on a dramatic curtailment of the right to strike. The aim of this 
Part is to show how this program coalesced. 
The process can be understood in terms of several overlapping 
developments.  First, the Taft-Hartley amendments translated the le-
gal and political opposition to the sit-down strikes of the 1930s and 
1940s into a body of Board jurisprudence that has substantially and 
permanently limited the right of reinstatement in the context of 
picket-line violence and other forms of strike-related misconduct.
413
  
As a result, unions have been barred from bringing to bear effective 
forms of protest.  Second, Fansteel and Southern Steamship have armed 
the courts with a jurisprudence well suited to police aggressively the 
boundaries of acceptable strike behavior, in particular by holding 
watch over Board efforts to reinstate strikers notwithstanding some 
degree of misconduct on their part.
414
  Third, the response of the 
Board and the courts to the sit-down strikes has helped to frame a 
particular notion of preemption law that has authorized state and lo-
cal governments to assume prominent, and often reactionary, roles in 
the regulation of strike misconduct.
415
  Closely related to this is the 
doctrine derived from Southern Steamship that labor rights must yield 
to other regimes of federal policy whenever they might come into 
conflict.  While not typically relevant to strikes and related protests, 
this rule too has significantly limited other labor rights and stands as 
a telling symbol of the degradation of labor law. 
A. The Board, Taft-Hartley, and the Diminution of Reinstatement 
Rights 
The discussion in Part III makes clear that the most important 
long-term legacy of the sit-down strikes is their role in securing the 
passage of Taft-Hartley.  The statute of course was passed over Presi-
dent Truman’s veto by a wide majority,
416
 representing the culmina-
tion of years of anti-labor politics rooted in the resistance to any func-
tional regime of labor rights that would actually achieve anything like 
 
 413 See infra Part IV.A. 
 414 See infra Part IV.B. 
 415 See infra Part IV.C. 
 416 See GROSS, supra note 110, at 259. 
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a legally mandated (or mediated) balance of power in the relation-
ship between labor and capital.  Taft-Hartley’s supporters were well 
aware that confessing to this agenda would hardly have advanced 
their cause.  Indeed, in the past, supporters of the Wagner Act and 
the original Board had successfully opposed similar legislation in part 
by characterizing proposed reforms as unwarranted, and perhaps 
pretextual, entrenchments on basic labor rights.
417
  But the claim that 
amending the Wagner Act was necessary to prevent the kind of law-
lessness so thoroughly associated with the sit-down strikes subverted 
this criticism.  It may well be that an anti-labor statute broadly akin to 
Taft-Hartley would have been enacted in any case.  But it is also clear 
that the sit-down strikes made the enactment of such a profoundly 
anti-labor law much easier than it would otherwise have been.  The 
specific appeal to the sit-down strikes during the legislative process 
likely made it possible for Taft-Hartley’s supporters to mount a more 
aggressive assault on labor rights than would otherwise have been 
feasible and, critically, to focus this assault more directly on the right 
to strike. 
Key personnel with the Board under President Truman, includ-
ing its conservative chairman, Paul Herzog, opposed Taft-Hartley and 
initially signaled they could not in good conscience abide its man-
dates.
418
  Even before Board membership was reconstituted under 
President Eisenhower—a development that finally led the Board in a 
decisively anti-labor direction
419
—the agency embraced the limita-
tions that Taft-Hartley had placed, via section 8(a)(1)(A) and the 
amendments to sections 10(c) and 13, on its authority to protect the 
right to strike.  Since Taft-Hartley, the Board has largely adhered to 
these statutory mandates, making clear that reinstatement is impro-
per when workers engage in serious acts of violence or destruction, 
including physically assaulting replacement workers and crossovers or 
company officials,
420
 and throwing missiles at replacement workers 
and crossovers or their cars.
421
  Neither criminal conviction nor for-
mal criminal charges are required for reinstatement to be denied; on 
 
 417 Hearings on NLRA Amendments, supra note 380, at 475, 489–90, 520, 523–24, 
4215, 4320–22. 
 418 JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS 
POLICY, 1947–1994, at 1–13 (1995). 
 419 Id. at 114–17. 
 420 See, e.g., NLRB v. Kelko Corp., 178 F.2d 578, 582–83 (4th Cir. 1949); Bartlett-
Collins Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 144, 171–73, 176 (1977). 
 421 See, e.g., Bryan Infants Wear Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 1305, 1307–08 (1978); Int’l 
Harvester Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 166, 166–69 (1976); Beaver Bros. Baking Co., 171 
N.L.R.B. 700, 718 (1968). 
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occasion, the Board has even applied this position on violence and 
the like so strictly as to deny reinstatement to workers innocent of any 
misconduct, simply because of what other unknown persons might 
have done.
422
  The Board likewise denies reinstatement where strikers 
verbally threaten replacement workers, crossovers, or other company 
employees, or where workers menace such persons through symbolic 
methods, such as by possessing a weapon on the picket line.
423
  The 
Board also denies reinstatement where workers stage mass pickets 
that coerce replacement workers and crossovers or that impede 
access to the employer’s establishment.
424
  Of course, if any such mis-
conduct is attributable to the union or its agents, it will also constitute 
grounds for a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation, and thus become the sub-
ject of a prospectively worded cease and desist order.
425
 
To be sure, the Board has continued to make some effort to bal-
ance these policies against the law’s ostensible protection of the right 
of workers to strike free of excessive coercion and discrimination by 
their employers, holding that “minor acts of misconduct” would not 
necessarily abrogate its prerogative to reinstate workers;
426
 that provo-
cation is sometimes a relevant consideration in misconduct cases;
427
 
that workers otherwise guilty of misconduct might yet be entitled to 
reinstatement if their employer has condoned the behavior in ques-
tion;
428
 and that under its so-called “Thayer Doctrine,” the Board may 
order the reinstatement of strikers guilty of misconduct where the 
employer itself has committed serious violations of the labor law and 
reinstatement would best advance the purposes of the law.
429
  Similar-
 
 422 See, e.g., BVD Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1412, 1415–17 (1954). 
 423 See, e.g., Va. Holding Corp., 293 N.L.R.B. 182, 188, 210 (1989); Gem Urethane 
Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1353–54 (1987). 
 424 See, e.g., Metro. Dist. Council of Phila. & Vicinity, 281 N.L.R.B. 493, 497–98 
(1986); Local 1291, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 266 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1204–07 (1983); 
Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455, 243 N.L.R.B. 340, 340–41 (1979); Metal Polishers 
Int’l Union, Local No. 67, 200 N.L.R.B. 335, 335–37 (1972). 
 425 See, e.g., Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 134 N.L.R.B. 1713, 1713, 
1724–26 (1961); In re Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 
1487, 1507, 1517–18 (1948).  Likewise, evidence of a section 8(a)(1) violation may be 
used by an employer to defend against reinstatement.  See, e.g., Gem Urethane Corp., 
284 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1352–53 (1987). 
 426 See Coronet Casuals Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973). 
 427 See, e.g., Ornamental Iron Work Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 473, 473 n.1 (1989); Mosher 
Steel Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1169 (1976). 
 428 See NLRB v. Colonial Press, Inc., 509 F.2d 850, 854–57 (8th Cir. 1975); Jones & 
McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 103 (7th Cir. 1971); Fed. Prescription Serv., 
203 N.L.R.B. 975, 975–76 (1973). 
 429 NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748, 752–55 (1st Cir. 1953). 
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ly, while the Board has adhered to the spirit of Taft-Hartley in deny-
ing the protections of the labor law to mass picketers, it has done so 
not simply by counting the picketers but rather by inquiring whether 
such picketing was truly violent or coercive, or has actually blocked 
access.
430
 
The nature of these qualifications to the law of misconduct, 
however, should not be exaggerated.  They reflect less a fundamental 
opposition to the Taft-Hartley amendments than modest efforts by 
the Board to accommodate the law of misconduct to the complicated 
and often tumultuous realities of modern labor relations.  Notably 
absent in such cases is the kind of aggressively realistic prioritization 
of basic labor rights that often characterized the Board’s approach to 
such cases in the late 1930s and (to a degree) early 1940s.  Neverthe-
less, even these modest attempts to accommodate the concept of mis-
conduct to the larger purposes of the statute have proved unaccepta-
ble to conservative politicians and academics and objectionable to 
some courts.
431
  In 1984, such hostility combined with changes in 
Board personnel and politics to prompt a re-articulation of the 
Board’s approach to misconduct cases.  In Clear Pine Moulding, Inc., 
the Board appeared to renounce the Thayer Doctrine, particularly 
the idea of balancing the severity of the employer’s violations of the 
statute against the striker’s misconduct.
432
  Instead, appealing explicit-
ly to the legislative history of Taft-Hartley and the debate surrounding 
Fansteel, the Board re-emphasized that reinstatement would be prohi-
bited whenever a striker’s misconduct approximates a violation of 
section 8(b)(1)—that is, whenever it “reasonably tend[s] to coerce or 
intimidate employees [including replacement workers or crossovers] 
 
 430 See, e.g., United Steelworkers, 137 N.L.R.B. 95, 98 (1962); Local Union No. 
5895, United Steelworkers, 132 N.L.R.B. 127, 128–30 (1961); In re Local No. 1150, 
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 972, 973–79 (1949).  The Board is 
apparently constrained in this regard by the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., UAW v. Rus-
sell, 356 U.S. 634, 639–40 & n.4 (1958). 
 431 See, e.g., Chevron  U.S.A. Inc. v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 359, 359–62 (3d Cir. 1982); 
NLRB v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 574 F.2d 835, 843–44 (5th Cir. 1978); Associated 
Grocers of New England v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB v. W.C. 
McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d 519, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1977); Closing the Legal Loophole for Un-
ion Violence: Hearing on S.230 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1–3, 5–6, 
7–13 (1997) (statements of Sen. Orrin Hatch and Sen. Strom Thurmond, and open-
ing testimony of former Att’y Gen. of the United States Edwin Meese); Labor Violence: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 1–9 (1985) 
(opening statements of senators regarding labor violence); ARMAND J. THIEBOLT, JR. & 
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNION VIOLENCE: THE RECORD AND THE RESPONSE BY COURTS, 
LEGISLATURES, AND THE NLRB passim (1983). 
 432 See Clear Pine Moulding, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 n.25 (1984). 
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in the exercise of rights protected under the Act.”
433
  The Board also 
held that even mere words, unaccompanied by threatening conduct, 
could meet this test.
434
  Furthermore, the Board also emphasized that 
this limit on reinstatement rights should apply from an objective 
perspective—that is, without regard to whether any employees were 
actually coerced or intimidated.
435
 
The Board has since retreated somewhat from Clear Pine, indicat-
ing that Clear Pine did not entirely abolish the Thayer Doctrine, that 
employer condonation would remain a valid consideration in mis-
conduct cases, and that not every instance of misconduct would pro-
hibit reinstatement.
436
  But as with other apparently significant shifts 
in the Board’s law of reinstatement, these moves should not be ac-
corded greater significance than they deserve.  For Clear Pine itself is 
best viewed from the outset as less about shifting doctrine than 
reemphasizing the Board’s fidelity to the overall program of Fansteel 
(and, less directly, Southern Steamship) as embodied in the Taft-Hartley 
amendments.  Notwithstanding such apparent vacillations, the 
Board’s position on reinstatement has remained broadly consistent in 
the post-Taft-Hartley period—and consistently adherent to that sta-
tute’s basic agenda.  Simply put, the reactionary vision that emerged 
in the era of the sit-down strike has been thoroughly realized in a 
body of labor law that denies reinstatement to workers whose protest 
tactics are substantially offensive to property rights and conservative 
notions of social order. 
B. Fansteel, Southern Steamship and the Judicial Denigration of 
Labor Rights 
In the decades since Taft-Hartley, courts have regularly drawn 
directly on Fansteel and Southern Steamship to circumscribe the boun-
daries of the right to strike.
437
  The most frequent expression of this 
practice has been the courts’ use of these cases to rebuke Board at-
 
 433 Id. at 1047 (citing W.C. McQuaide, Inc., 552 F.2d at 527). 
 434 Id. 
 435 Id. 
 436 See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Agency, 340 N.L.R.B. 1019, 1024 (2003); Briar 
Crest Nursing Home, 333 N.L.R.B. 935, 938 (2001); Mohawk Liqueur Co., 300 
N.L.R.B. 1075, 1075 n.3 (1990); Chesapeake Plywood, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 201, 201 
(1989). 
 437 See NLRB v. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d 998, 1003–05 (8th Cir. 1965) (listing 
cases where courts have tied Fansteel or Southern Steamship to construction of sections 
8(b)(1)(A), 10(c), or 13). 
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tempts to reinstate strikers—as occurred in the lead-up to Clear Pine.
438
  
Notably, the courts have resorted to the sit-down strike cases in this 
fashion, not for the purpose of correcting gross deviations by the 
Board from the letter of the Taft-Hartley amendments or the clear 
holdings of Fansteel and Southern Steamship, but rather to rein in mod-
est efforts of the Board to accommodate these doctrines with the ba-
sic purposes of the labor law.
439
  Especially worthy of mention in this 
regard are cases where the courts have appealed to these earlier cases 
to justify decisions that they apparently would not or could not base 
in the Taft-Hartley amendments.
440
 
A notorious example of this is the 1947 (pre-Taft-Hartley) deci-
sion of the Seventh Circuit in NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., where the 
court held that Fansteel required that it overturn the Board’s reins-
tatement of four strikers because they supposedly barred the plant 
manager from entering the plant.
441
  The court’s decision is particu-
larly notable in light of the fact that the picketing in question was, 
without dispute, entirely peaceful and that the Board (and the trial 
examiner) had found that the strikers had no intention of blocking 
the manager’s entry, were not hostile or threatening to him, and only 
partially and momentarily obstructed his movement.
442
  For the ma-
jority, these determinations had to yield to the view that the em-
ployees’ actions constituted “a forceable denial of the employer’s 
right to go upon its property . . . equivalent [to] a seizure of the em-
ployer’s property,” and that this placed their conduct squarely within 
the rule of Fansteel.
443
  The court in fact quite reifies Fansteel, repeated-
ly quoting the decision’s reactionary pronouncements on the interre-
lationship of labor rights and private property with an apparent un-
derstanding that simply doing so negates any need to muster 
principled reasons to overturn the Board.
444
 
Similar cases have emerged since Taft-Hartley.  For example, a 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit drew on Fans-
teel to overturn a Board order reinstating strikers who threw objects 
on the picket line where it was never clearly established what was 
thrown, “how hard” it was thrown, or who the target was; and where 
 
 438 See infra notes 441–53 and accompanying text. 
 439 See id. 
 440 See id. 
 441 NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 442 Id. at 568–69. 
 443 Id. at 572. 
 444 Id. at 568, 572–74. 
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no real damage or injury was inflicted.
445
  In the court’s view, Fansteel 
precluded the Board’s attempt to consider such subtleties.
446
  In simi-
lar fashion, the Second Circuit overturned a Board attempt to protect 
the right of striking doctors to inform their employer’s potential pa-
tient-customers of their view of the quality of the hospital’s services.
447
  
Other courts have cited Fansteel and Southern Steamship when rejecting 
the Board’s attempt to reinstate workers where the employee (a driv-
er and union organizer) was discharged in clear violation of the sta-
tute but also could not qualify for company insurance coverage;
448
 
where the Board invoked the condonation doctrine to reinstate 
workers fired for participating in a strike calculated to cause damage 
to the employer’s plant;
449
 where the Board cited provocation to 
reinstate strikers who had deterred a crossover by brandishing a rock 
and briefly blocked access to the employer’s plant; 
450
 where the 
Board, after placing such conduct in the context of typical picket-line 
dynamics, ordered the reinstatement of strikers who used “unseemly 
language” and assaulted a strikebreaker in a rather trivial fashion;
451
 
where the Board ordered the reinstatement, on grounds of condona-
tion, of strikers who blocked access to the employer’s business;
452
 and 
where the Board ordered the reinstatement of strikers because the 
employer had rehired other strikers guilty of similar misconduct.
453
 
To be sure, not all courts have second-guessed the Board in this 
manner, and some courts have even sided with the Board in recogniz-
ing some limits in the degree to which Fansteel and Southern Steamship 
govern misconduct cases.
454
  Nevertheless, an overall trend is clearly 
evident, whereby the courts have drawn on Fansteel and Southern 
 
 445 See Schreiber Mfg., Inc. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 446 Id. at 413–15. 
 447 Montefiore Hosp. and Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 510, 516–17 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 448 Neb. Bulk Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1979). 
 449 NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 413 (5th Cir. 1955). 
 450 NLRB v. Trumbull Asphalt Co. of Del., 327 F.2d 841, 844–46 (8th Cir. 1964). 
 451 NLRB v. Longview Furniture Co., 206 F.2d 274, 275–76 (4th Cir. 1953). 
 452 NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70, 74–75 (3d Cir. 1954). 
 453 Id. at 70. 
 454 See, e.g., Berbiglia, Inc. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 839, 843 (8th Cir. 1979); Donovan v. 
NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1323–24 (2d Cir. 1975).  Needless to say, these cases have been 
regularly cited for the similar purpose of upholding the Board’s refusal to reinstate 
strikers for misconduct.  See, e.g., Nat’l Conference of Firemen v. NLRB, 145 F.3d 
380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Gen. Teamsters Local No. 162 v. NLRB, 782 F.2d 839, 841 
(9th Cir. 1986); Rd. Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 18 
n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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Steamship, above all, to guard against any attempt of the Board to re-
vert to a kind of realistic administration of labor law. 
A similar legacy of the sit-down strikes for modern labor law and 
labor relations derives directly from Southern Steamship.  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in that case declared the Board’s attempt to reinstate 
the striking seamen unlawful because the Board’s construction of the 
labor law would have, in the court’s view, impermissibly subordinated 
the federal mutiny law to the Wagner Act and to the Board’s own 
construction of both statutes.
455
  But rather than offering some 
framework for reconciling this and related cases of conflict between 
the Board’s authority under labor law and other federal policies, the 
Court opined instead that in such cases, the Board’s authority under 
the labor law must yield.
456
 
This rule has been used to place real limits on the Board’s re-
medial powers. Most notable is the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, where the Court declared that 
the Board lacked the authority under any circumstances to order 
reinstatement or back pay remedies to the benefit of undocumented 
workers.
457
  Drawing explicitly on Southern Steamship (and more gener-
ally Fansteel), the Court reasoned that any other approach would nec-
essarily undermine the enforcement of the immigration laws.
458
  
Hoffman Plastic has been roundly criticized not only for placing undo-
cumented workers outside the protections of the labor law, but also 
for undermining both the immigration and labor laws by giving em-
ployers more reason to hire undocumented workers because they 
cannot hold the employer to its obligations under the labor law.
459
  It 
is difficult to gauge the overall effect of Southern Steamship (and Hoff-
man Plastic) on how the Board administers the Act in other contexts, 
given that the decision, above all, instructs the Board to decline to as-
sert its jurisdiction in the first place.  Nevertheless, the issue has 
emerged in Board decisions, perhaps most notably in a 2006 decision 
in which it declined to reinstate twenty-three fish processors who had 
been fired for engaging in a strike aboard ship.
460
  To reach this con-
clusion, the Board majority declared the processors to be “seamen” 
 
 455 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 456 See S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern Steamship), 316 U.S. 31, 48 (1938). 
 457 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 138 (2002). 
 458 Id. at 142–52. 
 459 See, e.g., Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline Decisions: Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme Court’s Role in Making Federal La-
bor Policy, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 & n.15 (2003). 
 460 See generally Phoenix Processor Ltd. P’ship, 348 N.L.R.B. 28 (2006). 
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within the meaning of Southern Steamship, depriving them of the right 
to strike by that decision, despite the fact that the processors had 
signed no shipping articles, had nothing to do with sailing the vessel, 
were at-will employees (who enjoyed none of the protections unique 
to seamen), and were never clearly ordered to return to work.
461
 
C. An Opened Door to State and Local Regulation of Labor Relations 
Another important legacy of the sit-down strikes for modern la-
bor law concerns preemption and state criminal prosecution.  In the 
appeal of their contempt convictions, the Fansteel strikers argued be-
fore the Illinois Court of Appeals that their prosecution for criminal 
contempt was preempted by federal labor law; specifically, their claim 
was that the dispute, which led to the strike, the injunction, and the 
contempt proceedings, arose directly out of Fansteel’s ongoing viola-
tion of the Wagner Act, as well as an apparent claim that because the 
Wagner Act vested exclusive jurisdiction of labor disputes with the 
Board, the Illinois court could not assert jurisdiction consistent with 
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
462
 
This contention raised serious questions, which the Illinois 
Court of Appeals could not simply dismiss.  For although the Norris-
LaGuardia Act left intact the power of state courts to issue injunctions 
in labor disputes, the extent of the Wagner Act’s preemptive effect 
was not yet so clear.  Moreover, unlike Norris-LaGuardia, which 
sought simply to limit federal judicial involvement in labor disputes, 
the Wagner Act undertook to regulate labor relations by the positive 
assertion of administrative jurisdiction; and the employer had indeed 
flouted such jurisdiction in the case at hand.  Predictably the Illinois 
court rejected the argument, declaring, first, that Congress could not 
have contemplated such a preemptive effect and that Congress must 
have expected that states would retain “their police power to protect 
property rights or punish illegal acts committed in the course of labor 
disputes.”
463
  Second, the court surmised that if Congress had given 
the Wagner Act such preemptive effect, doing so would have ren-
dered the statute unconstitutional—presumably on federalism 
grounds.
464
 
 
 461 Id. at 29–31. 
 462 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Iron, 
Steel & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938). 
 463 Id. at 994–95. 
 464 Id. at 994. 
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Significantly, the Board showed no interest at all in supporting 
SWOC’s position, either before the Illinois courts or in the way the 
Board litigated its unfair labor practice case up to the Supreme 
Court.  The Board’s position in Fansteel and Southern Steamship, as well 
as in the testimony of its top personnel before the Smith Committee 
and other congressional investigations, was actually opposed to 
preemption.
465
  In each of these contexts, the Board argued very spe-
cifically that its claim of authority to order reinstatement in cases of 
sit-down strikes or other occasions of violence was actually all the 
more legitimate—and all the more trustworthy as unthreatening to 
order and property—in light of what it assumed to be the unfettered 
prerogative of local, state, and federal officials to prosecute strikers 
for criminal acts notwithstanding the Wagner Act.
466
  Perhaps the 
most explicit—and prescient—example of this position can be found 
in the Board’s 1938 decision in Electric Boat Company, where the Board 
justified the reinstatement of sit-down strikers on the ground that it 
considered “local authorities” the proper arbiters of the “seriousness” 
of the underlying conduct; if local authorities refused to take the 
misconduct seriously enough to warrant arrest or prosecution, then, 
the Board concluded, there could be no reason for it to deny reins-
tatement.
467
  Congressional opponents of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments would apply a similar kind of reasoning to reinstatement law 
and attempts to statutorily outlaw sit-down strikes.
468
 
This accommodating attitude to the enforcement of state crimi-
nal law in the context of labor disputes cleared the way for this prac-
tice to emerge as a major exception to the broader principle that 
such intrusions into federal jurisdiction are unconstitutional.  The 
first clear articulation of this notion would come in the 1942 Su-
preme Court decision Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board.
469
  The case actually did not involve the crim-
inal law, but rather the enforcement of state unfair labor practice 
provisions against a local union for a variety of alleged actions, in-
cluding mass picketing, threats to crossovers, and damage to the em-
 
 465 See Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong. 3108–09 
(1947); H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 82–83 (1937), reprinted in 1 NLRB, supra note 394, at 
355, 373–74; Brief for the NLRB at 55–56, Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 306 
U.S. 240 (1939) (No. 436); Brief for the NLRB at 58, S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB (Southern 
Steamship), 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (No. 320). 
 466 See sources cited supra note 465. 
 467 In re Elec. Boat Co., 7 N.L.R.B. 572, 593 (1938). 
 468 See, e.g., Byron B. Harlan, Commentary, 16 CONG. DIG. 156, 156–57 (1937). 
 469 315 U.S. 740 (1942). 
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ployer’s property.
470
  While the parties to the labor dispute were clear-
ly within the jurisdictional reach of the Wagner Act, the Court saw no 
manifest conflict between federal and state jurisdiction.
471
  Moreover, 
the Court cited a passage from a Senate Committee Report which 
denied that the Wagner Act would function as an assertion of police 
power in its own right; the report noted further that existing judicial 
and law enforcement institutions, including local police, were ade-
quate to deal with “fraud, violence or threats of violence.”
472
  Of 
course such language is open to different interpretations, including 
being read to say merely that Congress wished to underscore the li-
mited kind of power the Wagner Act would give the Board in labor 
disputes.  For the Court, though, the passage expressed a more con-
venient point: that Congress meant to leave to state and local gov-
ernments considerable authority to deal with labor disputes, particu-
larly where the jurisdiction “was exercising its historical powers over 
such traditional local matters as public safety and order and the use 
of streets and highways.”
473
 
This argument, which directly informed the Court’s decision to 
uphold Wisconsin’s assertion of jurisdiction, seemed to legitimize the 
state’s role in the Fansteel strike and other sit-down strikes where the 
police evacuated, or tried to evacuate, the strikers.  Not coincidently, 
the Fansteel decision itself played a role in the litigation of Allen-
Bradley Local 1111, as the Supreme Court briefs of both the Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Board and the Allen-Bradley Company argued 
that just as Fansteel limited the labor rights of strikers engaged in il-
legal conduct under the federal labor law, it also legitimized a similar 
determination by a state labor agency.
474
  Indeed, with some cogency 
the company’s brief pointed out that if a state could arrest and prose-
cute strikers, such as occurred in Fansteel, then it should also be able 
to subject strikers to the less severe sanctions imposed by its labor 
board.
475
 
In the decade or so after Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, the Court 
decided a series of cases in which it expanded the prerogative of state 
 
 470 Id. at 742–44. 
 471 Id. at 748–49. 
 472 Id. at 748 n.7; S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 16 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, supra note 
394, at 2300, 2315–16. 
 473 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, 315 U.S. at 749. 
 474 Brief of Respondent Allen-Bradley Co. at 38–40, Allen-Bradley Local, 315 U.S. 
740 (No. 252); Brief of Respondent Wisconsin Employment Relations Board at 14, 
107–08, Allen-Bradley Local, 315 U.S. 740 (No. 252). 
 475 Brief of Respondent Allen-Bradley Company, supra note 474, at 38–39. 
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intervention in labor disputes to the point that states were permitted 
even to enforce their own unfair labor practice provisions in cases of 
picket-line violence.
476
 Unsurprisingly, both Fansteel and Southern 
Steamship figured prominently in UAW, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board,
477
 which in many ways was the most dramatic ex-
ample from this line of cases.  There the Court cited its sit-down 
strike decisions for the proposition that federal law could not 
preempt Wisconsin’s regulation of intermittent, arbitrary strikes be-
cause, among other reasons, the Board could not lawfully regulate 
such strikes.
478
  In 1976, in a move that signaled a more skeptical view 
of particularized forms of state regulation of aspects of labor disputes 
already governed by the federal law, the Court overruled this deci-
sion.
479
 
Nevertheless, since Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, preemption law 
has also evolved along a different axis, which has opened even greater 
opportunities for state and local governments to define the right to 
strike.  The Supreme Court has confirmed the idea that Allen-Bradley 
Local No. 1111 gives state and local governments broad license to en-
force their basic criminal laws in the context of labor disputes, an 
idea perhaps most decisively articulated in one of the Court’s more 
important decision on labor preemption, San Diego Building and 
Trades Council v. Garmon.
480
  In Garmon, which established the basic 
framework for analyzing labor preemption questions, the Court reite-
rated the notion seen in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 that “where the 
regulated conduct touch[es] conduct so deeply rooted in local feel-
ing and responsibility,” preemption could never be inferred;
481
 and 
the Court likewise affirmed that states have essentially unfettered au-
 
 476 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 suggested that states could regulate labor relations 
by adopting their own labor codes and accompanying administrative structures, so 
long as doing so did not excessively impinge on the federal regime.  Several times in 
the 1940s and 1950s, the Court considered how far the states could go in this regard.  
For example, in 1956 the Court upheld the authority of the Wisconsin board to en-
join violent labor protest, notwithstanding that such conduct was clearly subject to 
section 8(b)(1)(A).  The Court reasoned that Wisconsin’s authority to enjoin such 
conduct was merely a correlate of its “unquestioned” interest in “preventing violence 
and property damage” by means of its criminal laws.  UAW v. Wis. Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274–75 (1956). 
 477 336 U.S. 245 (1949). 
 478 Id. at 256–57 (1949). 
 479 Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 427 U.S. 132, 154 (1976). 
 480 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 481 Id. at 244. 
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thority to “act[] through laws of broad general application.”
482
  Gar-
mon presented those permissible assertions of state authority as li-
mited exceptions to a broader rule preempting the enforcement of 
state laws, even if general in nature, that impinge on the statute’s 
scheme for defining and enforcing basic labor rights.
483
  This ap-
proach has repeatedly confirmed the authority of state and local gov-
ernments to enforce their laws precisely as they had in Fansteel.  Sig-
nificantly, the Court has approved of such jurisdiction even where the 
conduct in question constitutes an unfair labor practice under the 
federal labor law—and would seem to be preempted according to the 
conventional analysis laid out in Garmon—provided only that such 
conduct involves “mass picketing, violence, and overt threats of vi-
olence.”
484
  Elsewhere, the Court has allowed states to prosecute for 
trespass strikers engaged in peaceful, orderly picketing, even where 
labor law arguably both protected and prohibited the picketing—and 
again would seem preempted by the usual application of Garmon.
485
 
These cases actually only begin to suggest how commonplace the 
arrest and prosecution of strikers has been since 1937.  No compre-
hensive accounting of such events has ever been conducted.  But a 
review of newspaper records and other published accounts con-
firms—even in recent times—the arrest of thousands of workers on 
charges of assault, trespass, blocking public thoroughfares, and so 
forth.
486
  Often this has involved mass arrests, sometimes of hundreds 
 
 482 Id. 
 483 Id. at 243–46. 
 484 UAW v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266, 274 (1956). 
 485 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 
U.S. 180, 198 (1978). 
 486 For recent examples of arrest for assault and similar charges, see Associated 
Press, RMI Titanium, Striking Workers Reach Deal on Wages, Pensions, AKRON BEACON J., 
Apr. 10, 1999, at D8; Peter Y. Hong, Jesse Jackson Leads Striking Janitors’ Protest, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1; Christopher Keating, Two Arrested Pratt Strikers Released With 
Warning, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 5, 2001, at B3; Michelle L. Klampe, Union OKs 
Contract at Auburn Foundry, FORT WAYNE SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 1999, at 1A; Terry Prestin, 
Consumers Feel Service Delays from Strike at Bell Atlantic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at B1; 
Kristin Stafanova, End of Strike at Verizon Not at Hand; Workers Seek Temporary Jobs, 
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at B8; Ian Swanson, Worker Who Crossed Picket Line Tells of 
Retribution, GRAND FORKS HERALD, June 5, 1999, at 2; Candus Thompson, Anger Builds 
Among Brick Workers, BALT. SUN, Aug. 17, 1999, at 1A.  For examples involving block-
ing streets and similar charges, see Associated Press, Casino Striker Injured at Picket 
Line, BUCKS COUNTY COURIER TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at 4C; Steven Greenhouse, Deal 
Ends Strike by Fairfield County Janitors, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at B10; Protesters 
Charged After Blocking Street, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Dec. 2, 2005, at B01; David Reyes, 15 
Arrested During Rally for Supermarket Strikers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at 6; Madelaine 
Vitale, Local 54 to Plead Guilty in Atlantic City Sit-In, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, March 8, 
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of workers at once.  In the early years of the Wagner Act, such arrests 
were commonplace.
487
  Notably, though, mass arrests in labor disputes 
continue even in recent times, as was the case in the Hormel meat-
packers strike in the mid-1980s,
488
 the Pittston Coal strike of 1989 and 
1990,
489
 the New York Newsday strike of 1990 and 1991,
490
 and the De-
troit newspaper strike in the mid-and late 1990s.
491
  The Pittston strike 
alone resulted in as many as 4000 arrests of union members and their 
supporters.
492
 
Where not arrested and prosecuted in conventional fashion, 
strikers and their allies have faced criminal charges in the fashion of 
the Fansteel strikers, such as charges of contempt of state court in-
junctions.  While the Norris-LaGuardia Act always applied only to the 
federal courts, in the 1930s many states adopted so-called “Little Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Acts,” which have limited their courts’ equitable juris-
diction over labor disputes.
493
  Nevertheless, even these statutes never 
limited the power of courts to enjoin strikes that are deemed violent, 
destructive, or otherwise criminal in nature, or that feature mass 
picketing; further, state courts have tended to construe their license 
to issue injunctions under such circumstances quite broadly.
494
  As 
 
2005, at A1.  For an example of trespass charges, see Angela Couloumbis, Display of 
Solidarity for Striking Wawa Workers, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 11, 1999, at B01;. 
 487 Such mass arrests were commonplace in the early years of the Wagner Act.  An 
apt example already mentioned is the 1946 Allis-Chalmers strike.  See sources cited 
supra notes 357–58.  A strike against Columbia Pictures that same year also resulted 
in mass arrests.  See 700 Film Strike Pickets Arrested, supra note 358; 219 Arrested in Co-
lumbia Studio Strike, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1946, at 1.  Hundreds of these protesters were 
eventually put on trial. See Studio Mass Trial Underway, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1943, at 1. 
 488 See Conrad deFiebre, Hormel Protesters Arrested After Blockade, MINNEAPOLIS STAR 
TRIB., Mar. 21, 1986, at 1A (reporting twenty-two jailed); David Hage, Police, Hormel 
Protesters Clash, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,  Apr. 12, 1986, at 1A. 
 489 See Associated Press, Pickets Arrested for Blocking Pittston Mine, LEXINGTON 
HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 26, 1989, at A8; Kenneth C. Crowe, Coal Strike’s New Arrests, 
NEWSDAY, Aug. 24, 1989, at 47; Bill McKelway, Judge Declines to Say What Will Resolve 
Fines, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 14, 1990, at B1; Ron Urban, Coal Strike Resists 
Settlement, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, July 15, 1989, at 1A. 
 490 See David Gonzalez & James C. McKinley, Jr., Violence and the News Strike: Anger, 
Blame and Distrust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1991, at 1. 
 491 See James Bennet, After 7 Weeks Detroit Newspaper Strike Takes a Violent Turn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1995, at A21; 65 Arrested in Detroit Strike, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Mar. 29, 
1991, at C7. 
 492 MAIER B. FOX, UNITED WE STAND: THE UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, 1890–
1990, at 530 (1990). 
 493 Note, Current Legislative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction Acts, 53 
YALE L.J. 553, 553–54 (1944). 
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with traditional criminal jurisdiction, the courts have consistently 
found that the federal labor statute does not typically preempt the as-
sertion of such jurisdiction.
495
 
These rules have given courts broad license to enjoin strikes, in-
cluding the ability to prevent strikers from deterring the use of re-
placements and crossovers by means of violence, mass picketing, or 
other conduct that might deter replacements and crossovers.
496
  Strik-
ers who defy these injunctions expose themselves to both criminal 
and civil contempt sanctions.
497
 
However it occurs, the effects of bringing criminal sanctions to 
bear in labor disputes go far beyond the punishment of individual of-
fenders.  Arrests, even if they do not result in serious fines or jail 
time, have disruptive effects that can undermine a union’s entire pro-
test campaign, particularly when large numbers of strikers are ar-
rested, when arrests focus on union leaders, or when arrests at an es-
pecially critical stage.  Moreover, the enforcement of the criminal law 
inevitably has a deterrent effect on other unionists who recognize the 
potentially enormous personal costs of militant protest, especially 
when those costs include a strong probability of unemployment. 
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Agric. Implement Workers, Local 486, 573 N.E.2d 98 (Ohio 1991) (sentencing strik-
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The role of the sit-down strikes in facilitating this state of affairs 
might initially seem attenuated.  Neither Fansteel nor Southern Steam-
ship established any direct precedent authorizing the assertion of 
state and local criminal justice authority in labor disputes.  Instead, 
these cases (and the Board) took for granted the legitimacy of such 
practice.  One does not have to believe that state and local govern-
ments should never be involved in labor disputes to see that such un-
fettered involvement exacts adverse consequences on labor rights.  In 
some ways, the Board could not have conceived a better occasion to 
make this argument than in Fansteel.  It could have emphasized be-
fore the courts how seriously the local police and the Lake County 
court had actually aggravated the dispute by their involvement and 
further marginalized the Board itself from its effort to administer the 
statute, and it could have demanded, on that ground, that the police 
and local courts be required to abstain until the Board had done its 
work under the Act.  This is, in fact, exactly the argument that the un-
ion made in its unsuccessful attempt to appeal the strikers’ contempt 
convictions to the Supreme Court.
498
  Of course, this argument prob-
ably would not have prevailed, given the ultimate disposition of the 
courts in these cases.  Had the Board pressed the argument, however, 
it might have provoked a political debate about the proper role of the 
police and courts in post-Wagner Act labor disputes.  More critically, 
the Board might thereby have legitimized the further litigation of an 
important question: how can the authority of local police and courts 
be reconciled with the basic labor rights protected by the statute?  
The Board could have potentially situated itself as a legitimate arbiter 
of this question. 
As it was, the Board took a very different course; it tried to bol-
ster its own authority by conceding the authority of local and state 
governments and then attempting to situate itself as an adjunct to 
such authority.  In so doing, it not only took for granted the unfet-
tered legitimacy of police and court involvement in labor disputes, 
but it also conceded to those who opposed the Board’s attempt to es-
tablish a robust system of labor rights as a backhanded means of chal-
lenging this effort.  What has happened since is that, as the Board’s 
authority and legitimacy in labor disputes have declined, the overall 
power and prestige of police and other law enforcement institutions 
(if not also courts) have increased.  It is in this context that the police 
and courts have reemerged as virtually unquestioned arbiters of labor 
 
 498 See Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. Lodge 66 of the Amalgamated Ass’n of Iron, 
Steel & Tin Workers, 14 N.E.2d 991, 993–94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 
642 (1939). 
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rights in the context of strikes, entitled to bring their authority to 
bear ahead of the Board itself. 
V. CONCLUSION: CHARTING THE BOUNDARIES OF LIBERAL  
LABOR LAW 
More than seventy years after the sit-down strikes helped inaugu-
rate a functional system of labor rights, their legacy consists of a reac-
tionary program that casts militant forms of labor protest outside the 
domain of protected labor conduct and confines the right to strike to 
a narrow range of utterly passive tactics.  Of course, this program has 
not been completely successful; sit-down strikes continued to occur 
for years after Taft-Hartley.
499
  Even more common, as the preceding 
section suggests, have been the other forms of protest prohibited in 
the wake of the sit-down strikes, including quickie sit-downs, mass 
picketing, countless acts of misconduct, and, occasionally, even orga-
nized strike violence.
500
  But these are definitely exceptions.  In recent 
years, sit-down strikes have been so uncommon that the recent occur-
rence of a very modest sit-down at a small plant in Chicago provoked 
surprise and befuddlement in the national media.
501
  Even lesser 
forms of militant protest, like mass picketing, have become relatively 
uncommon in the face of possible job loss and criminal prosecution. 
For decades after the changes framed by conservative reaction to 
the sit-down strikes were fully realized in the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments, the amendments had little obvious effect on labor relations.  
Union membership continued to expand towards a high (measured 
in percentage of workers) not reached until the mid-1950s.  But ap-
pearances are often deceiving, as this anti-militancy program has ac-
tually had important and lasting consequences—in two interrelated 
ways.  First, there is good reason to believe that this program helped 
alter the character of the labor movement over the long term.  Most 
important in this regard is the eventual collapse of the CIO as an in-
dependent labor federation.  Although many things influenced its 
 
 499 American Safety Razor Seeks Injunction to End Sit-Down Strike, WALL ST. J. Oct. 5, 
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strikes of at least twenty-four hours. 
 500 See, e.g., Zetka, supra note 262, at 215 (tallying “more than 400 wildcat strikes” 
in automobile production between 1946 and 1963). 
 501 See, e.g., Michael Luo & Karen Ann Cullotta, Even Workers Surprised by Success of 
Factory Sit-In, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, at A9. 
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eventual re-merger with the AFL, one factor undoubtedly was the 
CIO’s inability to bring its greater acumen with militant tactics to 
bear in jurisdictional and organizational disputes. The prohibition of 
labor militancy probably also helped change the character of the 
American labor movement on a more fundamental level, simply by 
discouraging militancy.  This judgment fits with critical literature that 
identifies the laws’ progressive narrowing of the right to strike as a 
mechanism that has compromised labor’s ability to maintain organiz-
ing momentum, build solidarity, and challenge employer hegemony 
within the workplace; instead, this literature argues, labor is left more 
and more to pursue narrow economic gains.
502
  The legacy of the sit-
down strike certainly accords with this thesis, in that the legal re-
sponse to the strikes not only prohibited direct challenges to employ-
er control evident in the sit-down strikes themselves, but facilitated a 
very literal narrowing of the domain of strike activity in a fashion that 
has all but prohibited the kind of mass action that unions need if they 
are to build genuine solidarity.  Likewise, by grounding the prohibi-
tion of quickie sit-downs, the response to sit-down strikes deprived 
unions of lawful access to the ideal weapon for challenging employer 
control within the workplace. 
A second and more immediate consequence of the sit-down 
strikes’ anti-strike legacy is that it has deprived organized labor of tac-
tics that are desperately needed to maintain labor’s relevance in the 
twenty-first century.  A resumption of open warfare between workers 
and management superseded the long détente between labor and 
capital inaugurated by the 1949 “Treaty of Detroit.”  It is, of course, a 
war of unequals, as employers use not only their inherent advantages 
as employers, but also their rights under the law to continue operat-
ing with crossovers and replacements.  And many employers further 
bolster these advantages by routinely violating the labor law, harass-
ing and discharging workers, and refusing to bargain.  In other 
words, the landscape of industrial relations today resembles in many 
ways the situation that gave rise to the sit-down strikes in the first 
place.  The difference now, of course, is that sit-down strikes, mass 
picketing, and other militant tactics that countered these practices in 
the 1930s are today thoroughly prohibited by the law.  Moreover, 
now, unlike in the New Deal era, this policy appears not as a one-
 
 502 In addition to the work by Klare and Pope, cited throughout this Article, see 
Rick Hurd, New Deal Labor Policy and the Containment of the Radical Union Activity, 8 
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 32 (1976); Holly J. McCammon, Legal Limits on Labor Mili-
tancy: U.S. Labor Law and the Right to Strike Since the New Deal, 37 SOC. PROBS. 206 
(1990). 
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sided confirmation of the law’s fundamental hostility to labor rights, 
but rather as a reasonable attempt to circumscribe the boundaries of 
labor protest. 
In this light, the use of the sit-down strikes to frame a narrowing 
of the right to strike also reveals something unique and important 
about the state of labor rights in capitalist society.  For, more than 
any other practice of labor militancy or any other area of labor 
reform, the sit-down strikes forced the courts, the Congress, and the 
Board to confront squarely the limits of labor rights.  The reason for 
this concerns the right to strike, which the labor law not only pur-
ports to guarantee but situates as a union’s primary weapon.  In mod-
ern labor law the right to strike is the mainspring of the entire regime 
of labor rights, including the right to provoke meaningful collective 
bargaining.
503
  At the same time, however, the labor law also defers to 
the traditional property and contract rights of employers, including 
the right of employers to continue business operations during a strike 
with crossovers and replacement workers (who, in the case of eco-
nomic strikes, may permanently displace strikers from their jobs).
504
  
This reflects a rejection of the corporatist approach to labor relations 
common in varying degrees in most other countries with functional 
systems of labor law, by which basic labor rights are buttressed with a 
variety of legal limits on employers’ traditional prerogatives to con-
tinue operation, bargain to impasse, withdraw recognition, and so 
forth.
505
 
This fundamentally liberal approach to labor rights contradicto-
rily venerates the right to strike while offering striking workers few 
means of realizing the right beyond the one epitomized in the sit-
down strikes.  For without the benefit of corporatist protections, labor 
rights, including the right to strike, are simply and quite lawfully ne-
gated by traditional employer prerogatives.  An employer can break 
most strikes merely by exercising its right to resume operations, and a 
union essentially has no viable means of countering this.  Workers 
seldom possess skills so rare that qualified replacement workers can-
not be found in numbers sufficient at least to demoralize the strikers.  
 
 503 For a statement of this principle by the Supreme Court, see NLRB v. Ins. 
Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483–85 (1960). 
 504 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938); JAMES B. ATLESON, 
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 21–24 (1983). 
 505 For a concise description of the differences between these models, see Tamara 
Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Regimes: The Contractual and Corporatist Mod-
es Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1005–11 (1986).  On the defining features of 
the American system, as articulated in the ideology of liberalism, see PETRO, supra 
note 9. 
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Equally improbable is that a union might rely on moral suasion and 
political education to deter crossovers and replacement workers.  
Such appeals, which already deviate from a mass-produced culture 
(and a semi-official ideology) that disparages acts of solidarity and sa-
crifice, and which must contend with employers’ formidable advan-
tages in propagandizing, can seldom overcome the more practical 
realities of genuine need among a hard-pressed working class—or, 
for that matter, the felt needs of workers in a consumer society. 
The one thing that workers can do is flout the law in a bid to re-
write the rules of industrial relations and challenge the factors that 
make solidarity so deviant in the first place.  In a full appreciation of 
this (and the jurisprudential forms that it often embraced), Pope’s 
most recent work on the sit-down strikes aptly describes the 1930s 
strikes as exercises in “worker lawmaking.”
506
  One can go a step fur-
ther and discern the same project in other forms of strike-related 
misconduct.  The worker who menaces a crossover, blocks a road, or 
hurls a brick at a carload of replacement workers is, in a very real 
sense, attempting to realize in full a right to strike that is otherwise 
only partially (fraudulently?) provided by the law itself.  But of course 
such conduct is far more likely nowadays to land a striker in jail or 
cause her to lose her job than change the balance of power in a labor 
dispute. 
Short of overthrowing capitalism and its legal order, the only 
apparent solution to this dilemma is to reform the labor law itself.  
The labor law might be redrafted such that it more thoroughly limits 
employer prerogatives in the arena of labor disputes.  This has al-
ready been attempted, most notably by efforts to repeal the replace-
ment worker doctrine
507
 and, more recently, by attempts to further 
constrain how employers respond to organizing campaigns and how 
they conduct themselves in collective bargaining.
508
  A more promis-
ing approach would involve revisiting Fansteel and Southern Steamship 
and their progeny.  The legal controversies surrounding the sit-down 
strikes, it will be recalled, were never really about anything so bold as 
legalizing the right to sit-down strikes, or for that matter picket-line 
violence, strike-related crimes, or conduct of this kind, but rather 
 
 506 Pope, supra note 3. 
 507 The most recent efforts of real consequence occurred in 1992 and 1994 with 
attempts to pass various iterations of the Workplace Fairness Act.  S. 55, 102nd Cong. 
(1992);  H.R. 5, 103rd Cong. (1993); Striker Replacement Act, S. 55, 103rd Cong. 
(1994). 
 508 The lead bill, which is still pending before Congress at this writing, is the Em-
ployee Free Choice Act.  S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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centered on the limits of the Board’s authority to administer the sta-
tute in a realistic and balanced way that successfully navigated the 
tumultuous realities of labor disputes.  If the Board were allowed the 
authority it sought in those cases, perhaps it could achieve some 
meaningful balance of labor rights against traditional property rights, 
order, and authority. 
These reforms are quite unlikely to come about and not certain 
to benefit labor even if they did.  Each contemplates a retreat from 
the law’s traditional, liberal approach to labor relations that is fraught 
with risks for workers and unions.  Corporatist labor laws inevitably 
pair the aggressive protection of labor rights with equally aggressive 
limits on union militancy and political opposition.  And it is almost 
certain in this sense that if such reforms were adopted, they would 
surely not rehabilitate—or even tolerate—the kind of strident mili-
tancy embodied in the sit-down strikes.  Aside from having to over-
come the obvious class allegiance of the modern state, sanctioning 
this kind of conduct would not only entail an unthinkable confession 
of the violence that inheres, un-remedied by law, in modern labor re-
lations, but also represents a breach of the social compact that is fun-
damental to the corporatist concept. 
I conclude this Article with a brief reflection on the fundamental 
tragedy of this whole affair.  The sit-down strikes quite literally made 
possible the rise of industrial unionism and the reign of an effective 
regime of labor law.  They arguably secured the legal foundations of 
the modern administrative state.  In these respects, they helped build 
a system of labor relations and labor law that indelibly altered the po-
litical economy and social fabric of post-war America.  The strikes 
helped overcome the entrenched resistance of reactionary employers, 
judges, politicians, and rival unions.  The irony and the tragedy, of 
course, is that these same anti-union elements quickly and deftly 
seized on the strikes to frame a powerful anti-union agenda.  We have 
seen how they used the jurisprudence that arose around the strikes 
themselves to craft their program, and how they likewise converted 
the sit-down strikes into an enduring and eminently effective symbol 
of supposed excesses of organized labor, the NLRB, and ultimately 
the labor law itself.  In all this there is both a shining affirmation of 
the strength that labor can wield through resistance and rebellion 
and an even more salient confirmation of labor’s fundamental subju-
gation in modern, capitalist society. 
 
